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ABSTRACT
This dissertation describes monitoring methods to achieve both security and
reliability in virtualized computer systems. Our key contribution is showing
how we can perform continuous monitoring and leverage information across
different layers of a virtualized computer system to detect malicious attacks
and accidental failures. For monitoring software running inside a virtual ma-
chine, we introduce HyperTap and Hprobes, which are out-of-VM monitoring
frameworks that facilitate detection of security and reliability incidents oc-
curring inside a VM. For monitoring the hypervisor, we introduce hShield, a
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) enforcement method to detect VM-escape at-
tacks. HyperTap, Hprobes, and hShield create a complete chain-of-trust for
the entire virtualization software stack.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the topic of this thesis: continuous monitoring in
virtualized computer systems. We begin by briefly explaining the significance
of this research, and then discuss the limitations of the state-of-the-art virtual
machine monitoring techniques. We conclude the introduction by summariz-
ing the our research objectives and contributions.
This dissertation presents three new methods to provide low-cost and ef-
fective continuous monitoring across all software layers of a virtualized com-
puter system. Our monitoring methods create a complete chain-of-trust for
the entire virtualization software stack: from user applications and operating
system running inside a virtual machine (VM) to the hypervisor running at
the bottom of the stack (see Figure 1.1). Our goal is that our monitoring
methods be:
• Low cost : incur small runtime performance overhead to the target sys-
tem;
• Effective: support a wide range of security and reliability enforcement
policies; and
• Continuous : expose no spatial or temporal gap for failures and attacks
to escape.
The next section explains the importance of this research.
1.1 Motivation
Monitoring is a vital part of operating a computer system. Particularly when
a system is deployed at scale, the efficient automation of monitoring is key
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to achieving resiliency against failures and attacks. We specifically focus on
the monitoring of virtualized computer systems because virtualization is a
critical technology enabling the design of modern data centers.
Why monitoring? Building a computer system is difficult, but reliably
and securely operating one is even harder. Undeniably, computer systems fail
(accidentally or maliciously) regardless of how carefully they are constructed.
In this terminology, failure is either a reliability incident or a security inci-
dent. While reliability incidents are primarily caused by the increasing the
complexity of computer systems, security threats increase as data stored and
processed by computers carry greater and greater value.
It is a well-established design principle to treat reliability and security
incidents as the norm, rather than the exception [1]. A system operates under
the assumption that it can accidentally fail or be attacked at any point in
time. Therefore, to produce steady and useful progress, the system needs to
be monitored so that adverse incidents are detected and mitigated as quickly
as possible. This is the principle that embraces high-fidelity monitoring as
essential to achieve resiliency in computer systems.
Our research shares the same core proposition with this design principle:
using monitoring as the main vehicle to cope with attacks and failures. We
focus on the design and construction of efficient monitoring methods that
can capture high-fidelity views of target systems.
Why virtualized computer systems? Virtualization is the means to
enable sharing and to achieve high utilization in modern data centers. In
2012, 51 percent of x86 servers were virtualized, a 13 percent increase from
2011 [2]. In addition to virtualized servers being more prevalent than non-
virtualized ones, the density of VMs on each server is also increasing [3].
The primary driving force of this trend is cloud computing, which lever-
ages virtualization on commodity hardware as the core technology to facil-
itate sharing. Not unlike other types of utilities, cloud computing benefits
from the economies of sharing and scaling. This is because sharing greatly
decreases the cost of computing resources, which in turn attracts more users
and providers to join the flow.
Given the abundance of VMs, an improvement in the security and relia-
bility of this technology will have a large impact.
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1.2 Target System Model
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Figure 1.1: A typical virtualized computer system. The virtualization
software stack is the target of our monitoring.
Throughout this thesis, the target of monitoring is a virtualized system as
depicted in Figure 1.1. The bottom layers, including Hardware, Firmware/Bios,
and Hypervisor/OS, constitute the host machine. The layers on the top,
including Application and OS, constitute the virtual machines. The host
machine can accommodate multiple VMs running at the same time. From
the perspective of users, VMs operate independently of each other.
Here we use the term VM monitoring to indicate any monitoring method
that has the protection target (or target for short) in a layer of the virtualiza-
tion software stack, including software running on a VM and the hypervisor.
When the context is unclear, we use a more descriptive term to indicate the
target of monitoring. Specifically, we use guest operating system monitor-
ing, or guest application monitoring to indicate that monitoring targets are
an operating system (OS) and applications running inside VMs, respectively.
Similarly, we use hypervisor monitoring to indicate that the hypervisor is the
target of monitoring. In addition, we use out-of-VM monitoring to indicate
monitoring techniques deployed outside of target VMs to monitor software
running inside VMs (e.g., monitoring is done from the hypervisor or from
other VMs).
In the designs of our monitoring, we assume that hardware assisted vir-
tualization (HAV), such as Intel VT-x [4] or AMD-V [5]), is an integral
component of the system, and is utilized by hypervisors to implement vir-
tualization. At the moment, all server-grade x86 processors on the market
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support HAV. Furthermore, all popular hypervisor implementations, such as
the VMWare hypervisor family, KVM [6], XEN [7], and Virtual Box, can
utilize HAV to execute VMs.
With regard to security monitoring, our threat model assumes that VMs
are the attack surface of the target virtualized system. This assumption is
derived from the model of data centers that rely on virtualization to serve
users and process workloads. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) in cloud
computing is a typical example of this model. In such a system, a user can
execute arbitrary software, from user applications to their own OSs, inside
VMs. Meanwhile, they do not have direct access to the host machine, except
via the VM-hypervisor interface provided by HAV (details are provided in
Chapter 2, which reviews virtualization and HAV background). Furthermore,
we explicitly trust the underlining hardware. We also do not consider physical
tampering and inside attackers (e.g., malicious administrators who already
have remote access to the host machine).
In this threat model, we consider two broad scenarios: attacking a VM
and attacking a hypervisor. The first scenario refers to attacks that aim at
compromising software running inside a VM. Since in a typical data center
setup most VMs must expose some remote access via the Internet to be
used, they are constantly at risk of being targeted by attackers. The second
scenario assumes the attacker has full access to a VM and exploits the VM-
hypervisor interface to launch attacks against the underlining hypervisor (and
other co-located VMs). For example, a public IaaS cloud allows any user to
launch their own VMs at a very small cost. Those VMs can be used as an
attack entry point to the hypervisor. Or a successful attack described in
the previous scenario may grant the attacker administrative access to the
exploited VM, which in turn can lead to an attack against the hypervisor.
1.3 Limitations of State-of-the-Art VM Monitoring
Despite the significant research effort that has been invested, state-of-the-
art VM monitoring techniques still experience some fundamental limitations
that dwarf their practicality. Those are limitations that leave critical gaps
for failures and attacks to escape detection. Here we present limitations in
regard to security and reliability monitoring.
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1.3.1 Polling-and-Scanning Monitoring Paradigm
Most VM monitoring techniques, e.g., [8, 9, 10, 11, 12], follow the polling-
and-scanning paradigm. In this paradigm, monitoring is done by scanning
the target system at a specific polling interval. This paradigm is also known
as passive monitoring [13].
There are two major limitations of the polling-and-scanning method. First,
it leaves vulnerable time gaps between consecutive polling intervals. Dur-
ing those temporal gaps, a transient attack, which completely removes its
footprint after completing, cannot be detected. We have demonstrated in
[14, 15] that transient attacks can be crafted to evade VM monitors with
a high chance of success. Next, this monitoring method can only scan the
static state of target system, e.g., the state that is stored in RAM or per-
sistent storage. What it misses is operational data about the activities of
the target system, which is necessary to enforce many security and reliability
monitoring policies.
1.3.2 Untrustworthy Input
The goal of monitoring is to capture and present a trusted view of target
systems. This view is used at a later phase in a system’s operational pipeline,
e.g., enforcing a security or reliability policy. Thus, the input of monitoring
must be carefully selected to faithfully represent the target system. This
requirement is particularly imperative in the context of security monitoring,
because attackers always proactively seek opportunities like this, which let
them manipulate input to falsify monitoring views.
However, many out-of-VM monitoring techniques [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] fail to
satisfy this requirement, as they rely on untrustworthy input. These moni-
toring techniques exclusively rely on data structures maintained by software
inside a target VM to derive views of the VM itself. It has been demon-
strated that if the guest software is compromised, those data structures can
be manipulated by attackers to circumvent such out-of-VM monitors [16, 17].
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1.3.3 Inflexible Monitor Placement
Target systems and attacks are both moving targets. For example, the target
system can be reconfigured or updated, or a new vulnerability or bug can
be discovered. Many of these events require a corresponding update in the
monitoring system. In addition, attacks are often carried out in multiple
stages [18], with each stage requiring a different set of monitors to fully cover
the trace of the attack.
For these reasons, monitoring systems need to be made ready for changes.
Moreover, changes in a monitoring system should not be a source of downtime
to target systems. This is however not the case for existing VM monitoring
techniques, which require monitoring setup and configuration as a part of
the target system boot process.
1.3.4 Incompatible Reliability and Security Monitoring
Reliability and security tend to be treated separately because they appear
orthogonal: reliability focuses on accidental failures, security on intentional
attacks. Because of the apparent dissimilarity between the two, tools to
detect and recover from the different classes of failures and attacks are usually
designed and implemented differently. So, integrating support for reliability
and security in a single framework is a significant challenge.
Current VM monitoring techniques are no exception. While there is a sub-
stantial body of VM monitoring research dedicated to security monitoring,
and some work dedicated to reliability, we are not aware of any previous
effort toward combining these two subjects of monitoring.
The above four identified issues in VM monitoring hinder its adoption in
production systems. Our research aims at (i) raising the awareness of those
problems via demonstrations of real attacks and failures, and (ii) exploring
new monitoring paradigms and methods that can resolve those problems.
1.4 Contributions
Based on the identification and demonstration of the limitations of existing
VM monitoring, we propose three new continuous monitoring methods that
6
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Figure 1.2: An illustration of our techniques to monitor a virtualized
system at runtime (e.g., during execution). The y-axis represents the
system layers from hardware at the bottom to user applications in a virtual
machine (VM) at the top. The techniques are positioned at the layers
where they provide monitoring: Hprobe monitors the VM’s user
applications, HyperTap monitors the VM’s operating system, and hShield
monitors the hypervisor.
address both VM attack and hypervisor attack scenarios mentioned in Sec-
tion 1.2. Figure 1.2 summarizes our contributions organized in relation to the
layers in the target system (y-axis) and system operational phase (x-axis).
1.4.1 Continuous Monitoring of Guest OS and Applications
For monitoring software running inside VMs, we introduce HyperTap and
Hprobes, which are out-of-VM monitoring frameworks that facilitate detec-
tion of security and reliability incidents occurring inside a VM. These two
frameworks can work in tandem to provide desirable monitoring features. Hy-
perTap primarily focuses on monitoring the guest OS, while Hprobes adds
guest application monitoring capability. On the one hand, HyperTap relies
on fixed and well-defined hardware invariants to achieve robust and strong
isolation with target VMs; on the other hand, Hprobes provides a mechanism
for dynamic and flexible deployment of monitoring in the target VMs.
Both HyperTap and Hprobes employ the event-driven monitoring paradigm,
which allows monitors to reactively respond to events of interest. In contrast
to polling-and-scanning, event-driven monitoring exposes no temporal gap
for failures and attacks to exploit. In addition, the event-driven monitoring
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mechanisms employed by these frameworks can capture target VMs’ oper-
ational activities at various granularities, e.g., system call invocations and
process/task-switching events. This provides a basis of support for a broad
range of security and reliability enforcement policies.
To demonstrate the capabilities of HyperTap and Hprobes in supporting
security and reliability monitoring, we introduced a set of low-cost and high-
coverage monitors:
HyperTap GOSHD – Guest OS Hang Detection. GOSHD detected
99.8 percent of injected hang failures in a guest OS. GOSHD is also able to
identify partial hangs, a new failure mode in multi-processor systems.
HyperTap HRKD – Hidden-Rootkit Detection. Rootkits are mali-
cious computer programs that hide other programs from system administra-
tors and security-monitoring tools. HRKD guarantees discovery of hidden
processes and threads regardless of their hiding techniques. We verify the
claim by testing HRKD against nine real-world rootkits in both Linux and
Windows environments, with various types of hiding mechanisms.
HyperTap PED – Privilege Escalation Detection. In a privilege es-
calation attack, a process gains higher privileges than originally assigned to it
in order to obtain unauthorized access to system resources. We demonstrate
that PED can detect this class of attacks, including attacks that success-
fully bypassed Ninja [19], a real-world monitor, by exploiting temporal gaps
created by polling-and-scanning monitoring.
Hprobes EED – Emergency Exploit Detectors. Often, a security
vulnerability is discovered. After the vulnerability is made public, a patch
takes time to be developed and must be put through a QA cycle. During this
time, the target system is at risk of being attacked at the known vulnerability.
We show that Hprobes can solve this practical problem by developing EED,
a class of detectors that can prevent the exploitation of newly discovered
vulnerabilities without patching the target system.
Hprobes AHD – Application Heartbeat Detector. One of the most
basic reliability techniques used to monitor computing system liveness is a
heartbeat detector. Using Hprobes, we constructed AHD, a monitor that
directly measures the application’s execution. That is, since probes are trig-
gered by the application execution itself, they can be viewed as a mechanism
for direct validation that the application is functioning correctly.
Hprobes ILD – Infinite Loop Detector. Infinite loops are a common
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failure that can cause process hangs. We demonstrated ILD, a monitor that
uses Hprobes dynamic hook placement mechanism to measure the worst case
execution time (WCET) [20] of a loop. The measure WCET is used to
effectively detect infinite loops.
1.4.2 Continuous Monitoring of Hypervisor
HyperTap and Hprobes rely on the trustworthy of the underlining hyper-
visor to deploy their monitoring mechanisms. We demonstrate that this
assumption can be violated by VM-escape attacks, which are attacks that
compromise hypervisor executions via VM-exits, the VM-hypervisor inter-
face provided by HAV (see Chapter 2 for a review of HAV). Based on the
analysis of this threat model, we introduce hShield, which implements a novel
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) enforcement method to detect VM-escape at-
tacks.
hShield continuously measures the CFI of every VM-exit handler, the ba-
sic block of hypervisor execution that handles VMs’ privilege operations.
The measurement is compared against a preconstructed Control-Flow Graph
(CFG) to validate whether a valid path is executed. In hShield, a CFG is
constructed using dynamic analysis, as opposed to the static analysis used by
state-of-the-art techniques, to enhance the precision. We show that attacks
can exploit the approximation of static analysis in building CFG to execute
insecure paths, while our precise CFG cannot be exploited in this way.
In addition to demonstrating the strength of the constructed CFG, we
show that our prototype of hShield is able to detect attacks crafted using a
high-profile vulnerability in QEMU [21].
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter reviews cloud computing, basic concepts of virtualization, and
state-of-the-art virtual machine monitoring research.
2.1 Cloud Computing
Our search has been influenced by the progressive growth in adoption of the
cloud computing model. This section briefly describes the context of this
driving force.
Cloud computing is the most recent form of utility computing. In the six-
ties, computer scientist John McCarthy envisioned that computation could
be delivered “as a public utility just as the telephone system is a public
utility...” [22]. Here, public utility refers to services that rely on shared in-
frastructures rather than on local ones. A public utility can be consumed by
anyone through subscription or pay-per-use. In the utility computing con-
text, computer servers, disk storage, and network media are shared among
users, who are billed per connecting time, CPU time, or used storage vol-
ume. These core principles of utility computing remain unchanged through
time-sharing services in mainframes, server-hosting services, and now cloud
computing.
After less than a decade of development, cloud computing has gone through
several stages of adoption, from interest and exploration, to experimentation,
and now to main production. In 2006, Amazon marked the beginning of cloud
computing with the introduction of the Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). In
2013, nearly 60 percent of small-to-medium businesses were using cloud com-
puting services [23]. Also in 2013, the public cloud services market reached
$58 billion in revenues, and this market is projected to be close to $200 bil-
lion by 2020 [24]. The growth in adoption, maturity, and financial viability
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is evident in that cloud computing has become a mainstream IT paradigm.
Cloud computing is a combination of three elements: enablers, providers,
and consumers. Enablers are the key technologies that facilitate cloud com-
puting. They include virtualization technologies for commodity hardware,
high-speed networking, and distributed computing resource management.
Providers are companies that successfully implemented the “As-a-Service”
model to offer their infrastructure, Platform, and software to customers
through subscription or pay-per-use. The early cloud providers include Rackspace,
Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and IBM. Lastly, consumers are individuals
and organizations who utilize cloud computing capacity to outsource their
IT needs or to build their own applications and services. Cloud consumers
wish neither to make an initial investment nor to continuously maintain a
computing infrastructure below their own software stack.
The relationship between a provider and its consumers determines whether
a cloud is public or private. A public cloud follows the standard public utility
model, in which the provider delivers computing resources via the Internet
to any consumers who agree to their terms, such as price and Service Level
Agreement (SLA). A private cloud is one in which providers and consumers
are strictly within the same organization. What makes a cloud private is
the clear boundary of responsibility between the provider and its consumers.
These two forms of cloud computing have been evolving in parallel to meet
different customer requirements, such as legal compliance or security.
Cloud computing has some unique features. Cloud computing, like any
other computing, specializes in processing and storing information. Unlike
other utilities such as electricity, gas, or water, information itself does not
have a physical form. As a result, information is not consumed in its use. It
can be shared and used simultaneously by many parties without any loss to
anyone. In addition, information is valueless without a context, e.g., it must
be delivered in a timely way and to relevant destinations. These properties
pose challenges when it comes to storing and processing information in a
shared infrastructure. For example, How can we control information so that it
flows only to intended destinations? Or, How can we guarantee the timeliness
and completeness of information delivery in an infrastructure we do not have
control over?
Cloud computing in its many forms has become a key computing infras-
tructure that supports business and governmental agencies across the globe.
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This requires a guaranteed level of security and reliability in the infrastruc-
ture itself and in its services.
2.2 Overview of Machine Virtualization
Machine virtualization refers to the act of emulating the execution of a log-
ical machine, called virtual machine (VM), in an environment controlled by
software. The controlling software is called Hypervisor or Virtual Machine
Monitor (VMM). In many cases, the term virtualization is used to indi-
cate machine virtualization. However, virtualization in its broadest sense
can include storage virtualization and network virtualization. Also, server
virtualization and desktop virtualization are popularly used to indicate the
particular types of machine, server or desktop computer, being virtualized.
Machine virtualization was pioneered by IBM back in the 1960s. The IBM
S/360-67 computers were designed to expose virtual resources to allow mul-
tiple users to work on the same hardware. In 1974, Popek and Goldberg
formalized the trap-and-emulate model of virtualization [25]. Trapping pre-
vents the VM from taking privileged control, and emulating ensures that the
semantics of the control do not violate the VM’s expectations.
Trap-and-emulate can be done either (i) entirely in software via binary
translation and/or para-virtualization or (ii) using hardware-assisted virtual-
ization (HAV). Binary translation is an extreme case of this model, in which
all instructions of the guest system are trapped and emulated by the host
software. One advantage of this type of virtualization is that it allows run-
ning guest systems whose instruction sets are different from the instruction
set supported by the physical processor. The down side of this technique,
however, is the high performance overhead for virtualization. Typical exam-
ples of binary translation are QEMU and JVM. In para-virtualization, the
trapping is done implicitly by directly modifying the guest system to notify
the hypervisor to emulate the necessary requests. This modification reduces
the run-time trapping overhead for virtualization. However, significant ef-
fort is often required to port the existing software system to para-virtualized
environments.
HAV supports an unmodified guest OS with small performance overhead
and significantly simplifies the implementation of hypervisors. Commodity
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HAV is designed for x86 platforms include Intel VT-x [4] and AMD-V [5].
Nowadays, all commodity Intel and AMD processors are shipped with HAV
support. The next section describes the principles of HAV in detail.
2.3 Hardware-Assisted Virtualization
VM_ENTRY 
VM_EXIT Guest 
Host 
VM 
Execution 
Handle VM 
Exit 
CR_ACCESS 
EPT 
IO_ACCESS 
EXTERNAL_INT 
… 
Figure 2.1: VM Exit mechanism in hardware-assisted virtualization.
In addition to x86’s privilege rings, HAV defines guest mode and host mode
execution. Certain operations (e.g., privileged instructions) are restricted in
guest mode. If a guest attempts to execute a restricted operation, the pro-
cessor relinquishes control to the hypervisor. If that happens, the processor
fires a VM Exit event and transitions from guest mode to host mode. After
the host has finished handling the exception, it resumes guest execution via
a VM Entry event. Figure 2.1 illustrates this mechanism.
Table 2.1: Example of VM exit event types
Event types Description
EXCEPTION An exception or interrupt is about to be delivered to guest VM
EXTERNAL INT An external interrupt is about to be delivered to guest VM
CPUID CPUID instruction is being executed in guest VM
WRMSR WRMSR (write to MSR) instruction is being executed in guest VM
RDMSR RDMSR (read from MSR) instruction is being executed in guest VM
HLT HLT instruction is being executed in guest VM
INVD INVD instruction is being executed in guest VM
INVLPG INVLPG instruction is being executed in guest VM
VMCALL VMCALL (or hypercall) instruction is being executed in guest VM
VMLAUNCH VMLAUNCH instruction is being executed in guest VM
VMRESUME VMRESUME instruction is being executed in guest VM
VMOFF VMOFF instruction is being executed in guest VM
VMON VMON instruction is being executed in guest VM
CR ACCESS Guest VM is attempting to access Control Register, e.g. Mov to CR3 or Mov
from CR3
DR ACCESS Guest VM is attempting to access Debug Register
IO INST Guest VM is attempting to execute an IO instruction (e.g. ioread, iowrite)
APIC ACCESS Guest VM is attempting to access APIC
EPT VIOLA-TION Guest VM is violating Extended Page Table (EPT) permission.
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Each type of restricted operation triggers a different type of VM Exit
event. For example, if the guest attempts to modify the contents of a control
register (CR), the processor fires a CR ACCESS VM Exit event. Table 2.1 shows
a partial list of VM Exit event types. In addition to the event, control fields
and the state of the suspended VM are saved into a data structure (VMCS
in Intel VT-x and VMCB in AMD-V).
2.3.1 Extended Page Tables (EPT)
In addition to virtualizing the CPU, one also needs to be concerned with the
virtualization of the memory management unit (MMU). Virtual memory is
the cornerstone of process isolation in every modern OS, and therefore it is a
necessary feature for VMs. Earlier implementations of x86 hypervisors used
Shadow Page Tables, which are data structures that contain mappings from
guest virtual addresses to host physical addresses. Shadow Page Tables use
a costly VM Exit synchronization technique to match the shadow structures
with the hardware page tables. To avoid this overhead, CPU vendors added a
feature, Second-Level Address Translation (SLAT) or Two-Dimensional Pag-
ing, to their virtualization extensions. This technology is called Extended
Page Tables (EPT) in the Intel Architecture and Nested Page Tables (NPT)
in AMD. With EPT, the hardware uses a second set of page tables to trans-
late from guest physical addresses to host physical addresses. Handling this
translation in hardware eliminates most VM Exits used to synchronize guest
page tables. Therefore, EPT provides performance benefits in most cases,
but it results in very costly TLB misses because an additional set of page
tables must be traversed [26]. See Chapter 28 of the Intel Software Developer
Manual [4] for more details.
EPT also allows specification of access permissions for guest memory pages,
namely ‘read,’ ‘write,’ and ‘execute’. Guest attempts at unauthorized ac-
cesses cause EPT VIOLATION VM Exits.
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Figure 2.2: KVM architecture.
2.3.2 Examples of Open Source HAV-based Hypervisor
KVM
KVM (the Linux Virtual Machine Monitor) is a kernel extension, which, after
loading, turns the Linux kernel into a virtual machine monitor or hypervisor.
Figure 2.2 depicts the KVM architecture. The hypervisor consists of a
KVM kernel module and one qemu-kvm user process for each VM (or guest
system). The KVM kernel module leverages the hardware virtualization
provided by recent x86 processors (e.g., Intel VT and AMD-V) to emulate
virtual CPUs (vcpu). This module is also responsible for entering guest mode
and handling memory management of the VM. After entering guest mode,
the guest code, including both the guest OS and the guest applications, is
executed natively, rather than using emulation or binary translation, until it
needs I/O access or receives incoming interrupts. In KVM architecture, all
IO operations are forwarded to user mode, which is the hardware emulator
qemu-kvm. A qemu-kvm handles all the I/O accesses of a VM. This is a
multi-threaded process. It creates one thread for each vcpu and one thread
to simulate other devices such as NIC (network interface card) controller and
disk controller.
In a cloud environment, the providers often do not control the user’s work-
load running in the guest VM. However, they need to take care of the soft-
ware and hardware layers running below the guest OS. In this case, there are
qemu-kvm processes, the KVM kernel module, the host OS, the management
system, and the physical hardware. Ideally, a failure should not propagate
(i) from guest mode to user mode or kernel mode, (ii) from user mode to
kernel mode or (iii) from hypervisor to the management system.
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XEN HVM
Figure 2.3: XEN architecture in hardware-assisted virtualization (HVM)
A XEN virtualization system is powered by the XEN hypervisor, which is
the most privileged software layer operating right on top of the hardware.
On top of the XEN hypervisor, one or more guest operating systems can
be hosted. After the hypervisor boots, it automatically loads the first guest
operating system (Dom0). Dom0 has special management privileges with
respect to other VMs, called DomU. By default, Dom0 has direct access to
the physical hardware.
To separate the mechanism and policy, XEN hypervisor exports a control
interface to Dom0. Application-level management software running in Dom0
uses this interface to manage the system’s resources. For example, xenstored
is used to store information about the domains during their execution and
to create and control domU devices. To support the unmodified guest OS,
XEN also uses a customized version of qemu (qemu-dm) to simulate virtual
hardware. Similarly to KVM, each VM is coupled with one qemu-dm pro-
cess running in Dom0. In the context of this thesis, XEN hypervisor and
the user-application management software are the targets for fault-injection-
based analysis. Figure 2.3 depicts XEN architecture in hardware-assisted
virtualization (HVM) mode.
2.4 Virtual-Machine-based Monitoring
Virtualization has enabled a set of out-of-VM security monitoring techniques [8,
9, 10, 11, 27, 13, 12, 28, 29] as well as new techniques to enhance the security
of traditional in-VM security monitoring tools [30, 31].
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Out-of-VM monitoring separates monitoring tools from protected VMs to
achieve stronger malicious-attack resistance than conventional in-VM (or in-
host in non-virtualized environments) monitoring techniques. Out-of-VM
techniques can be further classified into passive and active monitoring.
Passive out-of-VM monitoring techniques, such as LiveWire [8], VMWatcher [9],
XenAccess [10], Virtuoso [11], and OSck [12], use introspection to perform
integrity checking by scanning or polling states of protected VMs. Since
manual extracting of meaningful introspection from a guest OS is a costly
process, recent studies have proposed methods to semi-automate [11] or fully
automate [27] the generation of VMI tools. Even though the burden of
VMI tool development can be oﬄoaded to the complexity of the automa-
tion tools, the runtime performance overhead of introspection is still high.
Furthermore, many intrusion detection techniques and failure detection tech-
niques require intercepting and responding to events generated by protected
VMs [13], which this underlining introspection technique cannot do.
Active out-of-VM monitoring has been proposed to address the above lim-
itations. Lares [13], for example, is an architecture to securely place hooks
in protected VMs (or untrusted VM in Lares terminology) to intercept their
events and then transfer these events to security applications running in
trusted VMs. Lares, however, experiences two drawbacks: (i) high perfor-
mance overhead due to the implementation of memory protection at byte-
level (to protect hooks) and frequent world-switching (to transfer event from
untrusted VM to trusted VM) and (ii) vulnerability to event manipulation
because it cannot guarantee the integrity of the sources that generate the
events. In addition, Lares’ hook placement mechanism is intrusive to the
guest system. To reduce the amount of manual intervention in the process,
the authors of [32] propose a method to automatically identify locations to
place useful application-aware hooks.
Although out-of-VM monitoring has raised the bar for security applica-
tions, the underlying principle of using guest OS invariants to detect secu-
rity violations has several caveats. First, due to the complexity of modern
full-fledged OSs, it is impossible to cover all the invariants that could lead
to security violations. In reality, monitored OS invariants often belong to
known attacks [37]. Second, despite the physical isolation with protected
VMs, these types of monitoring tools still use internal guest OS states as
input driving their decisions. As demonstrated by [16], by using DKSM (Di-
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Table 2.2: Comparison of VM-based monitoring techniques
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rect Kernel Structure Manipulation) technique, an attacker inside the VM
can control the view of an outside VMI tool. Hund et al. [17] present a
technique, based on return-to-libc attacks [38], to implement rootkits that
can bypass kernel code integrity checking, which makes these rootkits even
stealthier under the view of VMI. HyperTap-based VM monitoring relies
primarily on the hardware architectural invariants, which directly reflect end
behaviors of protected VMs. Therefore our monitors can detect the abnor-
mal behaviors (e.g., hiding a process) regardless of their mechanisms (e.g.,
corrupting one of the guest OSs invariants), as long as the hypervisor is not
compromised.
Previous studies [28, 29, 33, 39] show how the hardware architectural state
can be used to interpret a guest OS’s operations. For example, Antfarm
[28] and its extension Lycosid [29] describe a guest user process counting
technique based on monitoring virtual memory (i.e., tracking CR3 in x86).
Ether [33] utilizes the VM Exit mechanism provided by HAV to record traces
of guest VM execution for oﬄine malware analysis. HyperTap builds on those
concepts to provide robust online monitoring for both reliability and security.
Out-of-VM failure detection has also been studied in previous research.
Virtualization has been used to enhance the reliability of the overall software
system. In addition, previous studies have explored out-of-VM failure de-
tection. Pelleg et al. [40] used decision tree, a supervised machine learning
technique, to detect failure in VMs using six hypervisor-level counters. This
technique, however, requires training datasets from previously known failures
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of the monitored system.
Table 2.2 compiles a comparison of existing VM monitoring frameworks,
including HyperTap [14] and Hprobe [36].
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CHAPTER 3
HYPERTAP: VIRTUAL MACHINE
MONITORING USING HARDWARE
ARCHITECTURAL INVARIANTS
This chapter presents HyperTap, a hypervisor-level framework that efficiently
supports continuous monitoring of VMs’ operating system. The core principle
of HyperTap is to rely on hardware architectural invariants to provide a low-
cost, reliable, and hard-to-bypass event interception mechanism.
3.1 Introduction
Reliability and security (RnS) are two essential aspects of modern highly
connected computing systems. Traditionally, reliability and security tend to
be treated separately because of their orthogonal nature: while reliability
deals with accidental failures, security copes with intentional attacks against
a system. As a result, mechanisms/algorithms addressing the two problems
are designed independently, and it is difficult to integrate them under a
common monitoring framework.
Addressing RnS aspects separately may lead to unforeseen consequences.
For example, a reliability monitor (e.g., a heartbeat server) may have a vul-
nerability that allows remote attackers to exploit the system. On the other
hand, a security monitor may introduce a new failure mode that the current
system is not designed to handle. Furthermore, different modules’ design and
implementation may not be compatible. For instance, suppose two monitors
both require exclusive access to a resource, e.g., a performance register. Such
monitors cannot co-exist in the same system. This situation places system
designers in a difficult position, in which they must trade off one essential
quality for another. In a milder scenario, the system has to pay a combina-
tional cost, e.g., development, deployment, and runtime performance costs,
of both solutions.
In this chapter, we identify the commonalities between reliability and se-
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curity monitoring to guide the development of suitable frameworks for com-
bining both uses of monitoring. We apply our observations in the design and
implementation of the HyperTap framework for virtualization environments.
A monitoring process can be divided into two tightly coupled phases: log-
ging and auditing [41]. In the logging phase, relevant system events (e.g., a
system call) and states (e.g., system call parameters) are captured. In the
auditing phase, these events and states are analyzed, based on a set of poli-
cies that classify the state of the system, e.g., normal or faulty. Based on that
model, we observe that although RnS monitors may apply different policies
during the auditing phase, they can utilize the same event- and state- log-
ging capability. This observation suggests that the logging phases of multiple
RnS monitors need to be combined into a common framework. Unification
of logging phases brings further benefits; namely, it avoids potential conflict
between different monitors that track the same event or state, and reduces
the overall performance overhead of monitoring.
A unified logging framework for RnS must be founded on an isolated root
of trust and have support for active monitoring. Current virtual machine
monitoring techniques, e.g., Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI), either ex-
hibit neither of those two properties, or offer only one at time. An isolated
root of trust asserts that the source of captured events and state cannot be
tampered with by actors inside target systems. Traditional VMI techniques
fail on that condition, as they choose to rely solely on the guest operat-
ing system (OS) to report its own state. An example of that violation is
presented in [16] (the issue is further discussed in Section 3.2.2). For RnS
monitoring, active monitoring (or event-driven monitoring) has been shown
to be more advantageous than passive monitoring (or state polling), as the
former can capture operational events in addition to the system’s state [13].
Furthermore, active monitoring can overcome the time sensitivity of passive
monitoring; e.g., it can detect short latency failures and transient attacks
[42], as further illustrated in Section 3.2.3.
In order to fulfill the requirements stated above, we present a framework
implemented at the hypervisor level called HyperTap, that provides an event
logging infrastructure suitable for implementing various types of RnS policies
for virtual machines (VMs). In HyperTap, the logging phase is common for
all monitors and constitutes the core of the framework. The auditing phase
of each monitor is implemented and operated independently. To achieve an
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isolated root of trust, HyperTap employs hardware architectural invariants,
which cannot be modified by attackers and failures inside VMs. These in-
variants hold under assumptions about the trustworthiness of the hypervisor
and hardware stated in Section 3.4.1. In order to support active monitoring
and intercept a wide range of system events, HyperTap utilizes the hardware
assisted virtualization (HAV) event generation mechanism. The events are
then delivered to registered auditors which realize a variety of RnS monitor-
ing policies.
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of HyperTap as a framework that
unifies RnS monitoring for virtualized environments, we describe the de-
sign and evaluation of three practical lightweight auditors: Guest Operating
System Hang Detection (GOSHD), Hidden Rootkit Detection (HRKD), and
Privilege Escalation Detection (PED). The GOSHD and HRKD auditors are
chosen to show that a common event, e.g., context switching, can be simulta-
neously used for both reliability and security monitoring. The PED auditor
is chosen to show the advantages of active monitoring over passive monitor-
ing. In addition to facilitating the unification of RnS monitors, HyperTap’s
dependable hardware invariants and active monitoring mechanism enable au-
ditors with high detection coverage. GOSHD can detect 99.8% of injected
hang failures, including partial hang failures in multiprocessor VMs – a new
failure mode revealed by GOSHD. HRKD can detect both hidden processes
and kernel threads regardless of their hiding mechanisms. And PED can
detect all four types of proposed attacks that defeat Ninja [19], a real-world
privilege escalation detector that uses passive monitoring.
3.2 Monitoring Principles
This section discusses the benefits of (i) having a unified logging channel
for all monitors, (ii) using active monitoring instead of passive monitoring,
and (iii) placing the root of trust at hardware invariants for virtual machine
monitoring.
22
3.2.1 Unified Logging
It is not uncommon for co-deployed logging mechanisms to conflict. For
instance, two monitors relying on a certain counter that only allows exclu-
sive access cannot use it simultaneously. A concrete example would be to
deploy both the failure detection technique proposed in [43] and the mal-
ware detection technique proposed in [44] in the same system, as they both
use hardware performance counters. In addition, one monitor may become
a source of noise for other monitors. For example, intrusive logging could
generate an excessive number of events.
The problem can be solved by unifying logging for co-located monitors.
Unified logging is responsible for (i) retrieving common target system events
and states, and then (ii) streaming them in a timely manner to customizable
auditors, which enforce RnS policies.
Aside from avoiding potential conflicts, the combination of logging phases
yields additional benefits. It can reduce the overall performance overhead of
combined monitors. To ensure the consistency of captured states and events,
logging is often a blocking operation. Once the event and state have been
logged, an audit can be performed in parallel with execution of the target
system. Therefore, combining blocking logging phases boosts performance,
even in cases where the captured states differ. Furthermore, this approach in-
herits other benefits of the well-known divide-and-conquer strategy: it allows
one to focus on hardening the core logging engine, and enables incremental
development and deployment of auditing policies.
3.2.2 Achieving Isolation via Architectural Invariants
An OS invariant is a property defined and enforced by the design and im-
plementation of a specific OS, so that the software stack above it, e.g., user
programs and device drivers, can operate correctly. In the context of VMI,
OS invariants allow the internal state of a VM to be monitored from the
outside by decoding the VM’s memory [9, 10, 11, 8, 12]. No user inside a
VM can interfere with the execution of outside monitoring tools. However,
monitoring tools still share input, e.g., a VMs’ memory, with the other soft-
ware inside VMs. Therefore, those monitoring tools are vulnerable to attacks
at the guest system level, as demonstrated in [16, 17, 45].
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An architectural invariant is a property defined and enforced by the hard-
ware architecture, so that the entire software stack, e.g., hypervisors, OSes,
and user applications, can operate correctly. For example, the x86 archi-
tecture requires that the CR3 and TR registers always point to the running
process’s Page Directory Base Address (PDBA) and Task State Segment (TSS),
respectively. Hardware invariants and HAV features have been studied in the
context of security monitoring [28] and oﬄine malware analysis [33].
We find that architectural invariants, particularly the ones defined by HAV,
provide an outside view with desirable features for VM RnS monitoring.
The behaviors enforced by HAV involve primitive building blocks of essential
OS operations, such as context switches, privilege level (or ring) transfers,
and interrupt delivery. Furthermore, strong isolation between VMs and the
physical hardware ensures the integrity of architectural invariants against
attacks inside VMs. Software inside VMs cannot tamper with the hardware
as it can with the OS. In this study, we explore the full potential of HAV for
online enforcement of RnS policies.
However, relying solely on architectural invariants and ignoring OS in-
variants would widen the semantic gap separating the target VM and the
hypervisor. The reason is that many OS concepts, such as user management
(e.g., processes owned by different users), are not defined at the architectural
level. In this study, we propose to use architectural invariants as the root of
trust when deriving OS state. For example, the thread info data structure
in the Linux kernel containing thread-level information can be derived from
the TSS data structure, a data structure defined by the x86 architecture.
In order to circumvent our OS state derivation, an attack would need to
change the layout of OS-defined data structures (e.g., by adding fields to
an existing structure that point to tainted data). Changing data structure
layout, as opposed to changing values, is difficult for attackers, because (i)
it involves significant changes to the kernel code that references the altered
fields, and (ii) it would need to relocate all relevant kernel data objects.
Not only are those attacks difficult to perform on-the-fly, but since malware
always tries to minimize its footprint, our approach significantly impedes
would-be attackers.
24
3.2.3 Robust Active Monitoring
Passive monitoring is suitable for persistent failures and attacks, because it
assumes the corrupted or compromised state remains in the system suffi-
ciently longer than the polling interval. That assumption does not hold in
many RnS problems. For example, the majority of crash and hang failures
in Linux systems have short failure latencies (the time for faults to manifest
into failures) [46]. An unnecessarily long detection latency, e.g., caused by
polling monitoring, would result in subsequent failure propagation or ineffi-
cient recovery (e.g., multiple roll-backs).
As we demonstrate in Section 4.3.2, a transient attack can be combined
with other techniques to create a stealthy attack that can defeat passive
monitoring.
Active monitoring, on the other hand, possesses many attractive features.
Since it is event-driven, there is no time dependence that can be exploited.
Furthermore, active monitoring can capture system activities in addition to
the system state, which passive monitoring provides. System activities are
the operations that transition a system from one state to another. Invoking
a system call is an example of a system activity. In many cases, information
about system activities is crucial to enforcing RnS policies.
Active monitoring is not foolproof, as it can suffer from event bypass at-
tacks. If an attack can prevent or avoid generation of events that trigger
logging, it can bypass the monitor. To make active monitoring robust, we
propose to use hardware invariants, specifically the VM Exit feature provided
by HAV, to generate events. Section 3.3 presents the hardware invariants
used to ensure the trustworthiness of generated events.
3.3 Hardware Invariants for VM Logging
This section describes events that can be monitored via hardware invari-
ants and VM Exit events, the core mechanism of HyperTap’s shared logging
channel. Table 3.1 summarizes guest systems’ internal operations, the hard-
ware invariants, and the types of VM Exit events associated with them. The
following sub-sections detail the use of these invariants.
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Table 3.1: Summary of guest internal events and related VM Exit types
Monitoring
Category
Guest event Related VM
Exit
Architectural Invariant
Context switch
interception
(§3.3.1)
Process context switch
(§3.3.1)
CR ACCESS The CR3 register always points to the PDBA of the
running process
Writes to CR registers cause CR ACCESS VM Exits
Thread switch (§3.3.1) EPT VIOLATION The TR register always points to the TSS structure
of the running process
TSS.RSP0 is unique for each thread
Interrupt-based sys-
tem call (§3.3.2)
EXCEPTION Software interrupts cause EXCEPTION VM Exits
Fast system call
(§3.3.2)
WRMSR, SYSENTER’s target instruction is stored in an MSR
register
System call
interception
(§3.3.2)
EPT VIOLATION Write to MSR registers causes WRMSR VM Exit
I/O access
interception
(§3.3.3)
Programmed I/O IO INST Execution of I/O instructions (e.g., IN, INS,
OUT, OUTS)
Memory mapped I/O EPT VIOLATION Access to memory mapped I/O areas, which are
set as protected
Hardware interrupt EXTERNAL INT Hardware interrupt delivery causes
EXTERNAL INT VM Exits
I/O APIC access APIC ACCESS I/O Advance Programmable Interrupt Controller
(APIC) events
Memory access EPT VIOLATION Accesses to memory regions with proper permis-
sions cause EPT VIOLATION VM ExitsLow-level in-
terception
(§3.3.4)
Instruction execution EPT VIOLATION Execution of instructions from non-executable re-
gions causes EPT VIOLATION VM Exits
At VM Start:
  PDBA_set = {}
  Monitor CR_ACCESS events
At each CR_ACCESS event (CR3 <- PDBA):
  if (PDBA not in PDBA_set)
    PDBA_set += PDBA
Count the Virtual Address Spaces:
  // save current PDBA
  Saved_CR3 = vcpu.CR3
  // Remove invalid PDBA
  for_each PDBA in PDBA_set {
    // Step 1: Change Page Directory
    vcpu.CR3 = PDBA
    // Step 2: Test Page Directory
    gpa = gva_to_gpa(known_gva)
    if (gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA)
      remove(PDBA_set, PDBA)
  }
  // restore the PDBA
  vcpu.CR3 = Save_CR3
  return size_of(PDBA_set)
At VM Start:
  Monitor CR_ACCESS events
On the first CR_ACCESS event (write to CR3):
  for_each vcpu[i]
    Set write-protect for vcpu[i].TR
    Monitor EPT_VIOLATION events
At each EPT_VIOLATION event on vcpu ([Addr] <- V):
  if (Addr == &vcpu.TR->RSP0) // vcpu.TR = TSS
    // V = Kernel_stack_base
    Forward_switch_evt(V)  
At VM Start:
  Monitor WRMSR events
On the WRMSR event (IA32_SYSENTER_EIP <- addr):
  syscall_entry = addr;
  Each VCPU: Set execute-protected for 
             the page containing syscall_entry
  Monitor EPT_VIOLATION events
At each EPT_VIOLATION event on vcpu (execute [Addr]):
  if (Addr == syscall_entry) {
    invoked_syscall = read_register(EAX);
    para1 = read_register(EBX);
    ...
    Forward_syscall(invoked_syscall, para1, ...);
  }
At VM Start:
  Monitor EXCEPTION events
At each EXCEPTION event (ex_type, int_num):
if ((ex_type == SOFTWARE_INT) && 
    (int_num == 0x80) || (int_num == 0x2e)) {
  invoked_syscall = read_register(EAX);
  para1 = read_register(EBX);
  ...
  Forward_syscall(invoked_syscall, para1, ...);
}
On the first CR_ACCESS event (write to CR3):
  for_each vcpu[i]
  saved_TR[i] = vcpu[i].TR;
Integrity checking (e.g., on every VM Exit):
for_each vcpu[i]
  if (save_TR[i] != vcpu[i].TR)
    // TSS has been relocated
    raise_alert();
E
A CB
D
Figure 3.1: Pseudo-code for each interception algorithm. (A): Process
Counting Algorithm, (B): Thread switch interception, (C): TSS integrity
checking, (D): Interrupt-based system call interception, (E): Fast system
call interception
3.3.1 Context Switch Interception
Process Switch Interception
Architectural Invariant. Process switches can be observed by monitoring
CR ACCESS VM Exit events. In x86, the CR3 register, or Page Directory Base
Register (PDBR) contains the Page Directory Base Address (PDBA) for the
virtual address space of the running process. As this base address is unique
for each user process, we can use it as a process identifier.
Process Counting Algorithm. We can count the number of processes
running on a guest VM by monitoring CR ACCESS events. This algorithm is
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independent of any data structure the guest OS uses to manage its processes.
Figure 3.1A shows the pseudo-code for the process counting algorithm.
The set of PDBAs (PDBA set) is empty when the guest OS boots up. At
each CR ACCESS event in which CR3 is modified (CR3 <- PDBA), the algorithm
updates PDBA set with the value that will be written to CR3.
Thread Switch Interception
Monitoring of thread1 switches requires more effort than tracking CR ACCESS
events, as threads can share the same virtual address space. In addition, a
thread can reuse the virtual address space of another process (e.g., Linux
kernel threads).2
Architectural Invariant. In order to manage threads, the x86 processor
uses the Task Register (TR) and Task-State Segment (TSS) structures. The
TSS, stored in main memory, holds the stack pointers of a task for different
privilege levels, and the TR points to the TSS structure of the current task.
The TSS is also used to support privilege protection. Each time execution
transfers from user level (3) to kernel level (0), the kernel stack pointer is
automatically loaded from the TSS by the CPU (e.g., RSP <- TSS→RSP0).
Since all kernel threads share the same virtual address range, each has a
separate address range for its stack. Therefore, the kernel stack pointer
(RSP0) stored in the TSS can be used as a thread identifier.
Thread Switch Interception Algorithm. Each thread switch modifies
the TSS stored in memory. Therefore, we can track thread switches by setting
memory access permissions. Specifically, on a guest system with EPT, a write
to an EPT write-protected address triggers an EPT VIOLATION VM Exit. We
use this mechanism to track the kernel stack pointer.
Figure 3.1B shows the pseudo-code for this algorithm. After the guest OS
finishes setting up its data structures (e.g., the CR3 register gets written for
the first time), the algorithm sets all pages that contain TSS structures (one
per vCPU) as write-protected. Each time a TSS structure is modified, the
hypervisor gets notified by an EPT VIOLATION event.
1A thread is equivalent to a task in the x86 architecture.
2kthreads reuse the virtual address space of the previously scheduled process.
All processes in Linux have the same kernel address range. Windows does not
have standalone kernel threads.
27
3.3.2 System Call Interception
System calls allow user mode processes to invoke kernel mode functions.
At the hardware level, a system call transfers the CPU from user to kernel
mode. That transfer from a lower to higher privilege is strictly checked by the
processor: it must be done through pre-defined gates. This section describes
techniques to intercept two types of system calls: interrupt-based system calls
and fast system calls.
Interrupt-based System Calls
The legacy method for issuing a system call in x86 is to raise a software
interrupt. For example, Linux uses INT $0x80 and Windows uses INT $0x2E
to issue system calls. The interrupt handler routine is the common gate for
all system calls, and parameters of system calls are passed through general-
purpose registers.
Architectural Invariant. In a VM, each software interrupt triggers an
EXCEPTION VM Exit.3
Interrupt-based System Call Interception Algorithm. We devel-
oped an algorithm that intercepts interrupt-based system calls, shown in
Figure 3.1D. If the type and number of the interrupt indicate a system call,
the algorithm records all the registers that could carry the system call’s pa-
rameters and then generates a notification regarding the system call.
Fast System Calls
A fast system call mechanism was added to x86 with the SYSENTER/SYSEXIT
instruction pair for Intel processors and the SYSCALL/SYSRET instructions for
AMD processors.
Architectural Invariant. The SYSENTER instruction takes input from
Model Specific Registers (MSRs) and general-purpose registers. For exam-
ple, SYSENTER’s target instruction address is stored in the IA32 SYSENTER EIP
MSR. An MSR can only be modified via a WRMSR instruction, a privileged
instruction that causes WRMSR VM Exits.
3Intel VT-x allows selection of which interrupts cause EXCEPTION VM Exits via an
EXCEPTION BITMAP.
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Fast system call interception algorithm. Figure 3.1E contains pseudo-
code for fast system call interception. The algorithm uses WRMSR events to
identify the address of the system call entry point in the guest VM. The
address is set to execute-protect so that a guest’s attempt to execute the
system call entry point will generate an EPT VIOLATION VM Exit.
3.3.3 I/O Access Interception
A primary function of the hypervisor is to multiplex I/O devices for its VMs,
except when a VM is given exclusive access via an I/O pass-through mode.
HAV provides several VM Exits that the hypervisor can use to capture IO
accesses from guest VMs. We categorize I/O accesses into three types:
Programmed I/O (PIO) is performed through I/O instructions, such
as IN and OUT. These instructions trigger IO ACCESS events when executed in
guest mode.
Memory Mapped I/O (MMIO) is performed through instructions that
manipulate memory (e.g., MOV, AND, OR). In order to trap MMIO, the hyper-
visor sets memory protection for the allocated MMIO area so that accesses
to this area will trigger EPT VIOLATION events.
I/O interrupts are interrupts raised by physical devices to notify guest
VM about I/O-related events (e.g., an incoming network packet). The pres-
ence of a pending interrupt causes either an EXTERNAL INT or APIC ACCESS
VM Exit event.
Because of the diversity of I/O devices, details for each type of device are
not covered, and it is up to implementers to choose an appropriate mecha-
nism.
3.3.4 Fine-grained Interception
The EPT feature presented in Section 2.3.1 makes it possible to track a
guest’s execution at the single instruction and memory access level by set-
ting appropriate access permissions. However, that fine-grained interception
incurs a significant performance cost. To minimize its impact, an auditor
should make use of that feature only for selective critical protection.
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3.4 Framework and Implementation
Following the principles presented in the previous section, here we describe
the design and implementation of HyperTap with KVM, as illustrated in
Figure 3.2.
KVM Hypervisor 
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Figure 3.2: Implementation of HyperTap in the KVM hypervisor. The
hypervisor is modified to forward VM Exit events to the Event Multiplexer
(EM), which is implemented as a separate kernel module. The EM forwards
events to registered auditors running as user processes inside auditing
containers. The Remote Health Checker (RHC) monitors the hypervisor’s
liveness.
3.4.1 Scope and Assumptions
HyperTap integrates with existing hypervisors to safeguard VMs against fail-
ures and attacks. It aims to make this protection transparent to VMs by
utilizing existing hardware features. Thus, HyperTap does not require mod-
ification of either the existing hardware or the guest OS’s software stack.
HyperTap’s implementation assumes that the underlying hardware and
hypervisor are trusted. Although extra validation and protection for the
hardware and hypervisor could address concerns about the robustness of
different hypervisors against failures and attacks, these issues are beyond the
scope of this work.
30
Capture VM Exit = 
Intercept OS ops
Obtain relevant HW 
state
Derive relevant guest 
OS state
In
sp
ec
ti
o
n
1
2
3
4
Context switch
Syscall
IO Access
Modify CR3 
register
Set MSR register
Issue interrupts
Page fault
IO instructions
External interrupts
VM Exit Events
Auditor 1
Auditor 2
Auditor 3
(A) Guest OS 
Operations
(B) Hardware
Operations
(C) Hardware
Virtualization 
Enforcement
(D) VM Auditors
VM Exit Events
(root of trust)
CR_ACCESS EXT_INT ...
HW state (root of trust)
TR CR3 RSP
TSS Page Dir.
Guest OS state
task_structthread_info
VM Auditor (running outside VM)SHARED EVENT LOGGING
RELIABILITY  & 
SECURITY 
AUDITING
Figure 3.3: HyperTap monitoring framework: (A) Guest OS operations
that are subjects of the monitors; (B) Hardware operations that are
required to perform each guest OS operation; (C) VM Exit events that are
generated before logged operations are performed; (D) The captured events
are delivered to auditors running outside the VM.
3.4.2 Monitoring Workflow
Figure 3.3 depicts the overall workflow of HyperTap. The left side of the fig-
ure illustrates how the shared event logging mechanism works and the right
side describes the auditing phase. HyperTap utilizes HAV to intercept the
desired guest OS operations through VM Exit events generated by corre-
sponding hardware operations. Since the HAV VM Exit mechanism is not
designed to intercept all desired operations, e.g., system calls, Section 3.3
presents algorithms to generate VM Exit events for such operations.
HyperTap supports a wide range of events, from coarse-grained events,
such as process context switches, to finer-grained events, such as system
calls, and very fine grained events, such as instruction execution and memory
accesses. That variable granularity ensures that HyperTap can be adopted
for a broad range of RnS policies.
HyperTap delivers captured events to registered auditors, which imple-
ment specific RnS policies. An auditor starts by registering for a set of
events needed to enforce its policy. Upon the arrival of each event, the au-
ditor analyzes the state information associated with the event. Auditors are
associated with VMs and each VM can have multiple auditors.
HyperTap also provides an interface that allows auditors to control to
target VMs. For example, the auditing phase is non-blocking by default,
but an auditor may pause its target VM during analysis in order to stop the
VM during an attack, or roll-back the VM when it detects a non-recoverable
failure.
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3.4.3 Implementation
This subsection presents the integration of HyperTap with KVM [6], hy-
pervisor built with HAV as a Linux kernel module. Figure 3.2 depicts the
deployment of HyperTap’s components.
HyperTap’s unified logging channel is implemented through two compo-
nents: an Event Forwarder (EF) and an Event Multiplexer (EM). The EF is
integrated into the KVM module, and forwards VM Exit events and relevant
guest hardware state to the EM. By default, events are sent non-blocking to
minimize overhead. The EM, which is implemented as another Linux kernel
module in the host OS, buffers input events from the EF and delivers them
to the appropriate auditors.
The EM is also responsible for sampling VM Exit events that are sent to
a Remote Health Checker (RHC) running in a separate machine. The RHC
server acts as a heartbeat server to measure the intervals between received
events. If no events are received after a certain amount of time, it raises an
alert about the liveness of the monitoring system.
Auditors are implemented as user processes inside auditing containers4
running on the host OS. Compared to the dedicated auditing VM used in
previous work [11] [13], this approach offers multiple benefits. First, it pro-
vides lightweight attack and failure isolation among different VMs’ auditors,
and between auditors and the host OS. Second, it simplifies implementation
and reduces the performance overhead of event delivery from the EM mod-
ule. Finally, it allows the integration of auditors into existing systems, since
containers are robust and compatible with most current Linux distributions.
We needed to add less than 100 lines of code to KVM to implement the
EF component and export Helper APIs.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents principles for unifying RnS monitoring. We identify
the boundary dividing the logging and auditing phases in monitoring pro-
cesses. That boundary allows us to unify and develop dependable logging
mechanisms. We demonstrate the need for an isolated root of trust and
4We use Linux containers (LXC) http://linuxcontainers.org/
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active monitoring to support a wide variety of RnS monitors. We applied
those principles when developing HyperTap, a framework that provides uni-
fied logging, based on hardware invariants, to safeguard VM environments.
In the next chapter, one reliability monitor and two security monitors will
be introduced and evaluated to demonstrate the feasibility and practicality
of HyperTap.
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CHAPTER 4
BUILDING DETECTORS USING
HYPERTAP
This chapter expands on the techniques presented in the previous chapter to
demonstrate how to build auditors using HyperTap. Specifically, we present
two examples that showcase how RnS monitoring can be combined (GOSHD
and HRKD) and one example that demonstrates the effectiveness of active
monitoring (PED).
4.1 GOSHD – Guest OS Hang Detection
4.1.1 Failure Model
We consider an OS as being in a hang state if it ceases to schedule tasks.
This failure model is similar to the one introduced in [43]. In multiprocessor
systems, it is possible for the OS to experience a hang on a proper subset of
available CPUs. If that happens, we say that OS is in a partial hang state,
as opposed to a full hang state, in which the OS is hung on all CPUs.
An example of a software bug that causes hangs in the OS kernel is a
missing unlock (i.e., release) of a spinlock in an exit path of a kernel critical
section. All threads that try to acquire this lock after the buggy exit path has
been executed end up in a hung state. If the hung kernel thread is in a non-
preemptible code section (e.g., either the kernel itself is non-preemptible, or
the thread has purposely disabled preemption), the kernel hangs on the CPU
that is executing the hung thread. The hung thread may also be holding other
locks, which can cascade into hanging of more threads. In a multiprocessor
system a partial hang usually results in a full hang. The kernel stays in a
partial hang state until the hang propagates to all available CPUs. However,
if the kernel has no other lock dependencies with the hung threads, it can
stay in the partial hang state until it gets shut down or rebooted.
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Distinguishing between OS partial and full hang is important for two rea-
sons. (i) Previous OS hang detection approaches use external probes, e.g.,
heartbeats, to detect OS hangs. In a multiprocessor system, mechanisms to
generate heartbeats may not be affected by a partial hang, and would con-
tinue to report error-free conditions. (ii) Detecting partial hangs results in
a shorter detection latency, as all full hangs are preceded by a partial hang.
The Guest OS hang detection (GOSHD) module discussed in this section
detects both partial and full OS hangs.
4.1.2 GOSHD Mechanism
GOSHD uses the thread dispatching mechanism discussed in Section 3.3.1 to
monitor the VM’s OS scheduler. The EPT VIOLATION and CR ACCESS mecha-
nisms in HAV guarantee that GOSHD can capture all context switch events.
If a vCPU does not generate any switching events for a predefined threshold
time, GOSHD declares that the guest OS is hung on that vCPU. Because
the vCPUs are monitored independently of each other, GOSHD can detect
both partial hangs and full hangs. From GOSHD’s perspective, guest tasks
are scheduled independently on each vCPU. Since GOSHD monitors the ab-
sence of context switching events to detect hangs, it is important to properly
determine the threshold after which it is safe to conclude that the OS is hung
on a vCPU. If this threshold is shorter than the time between two consec-
utive context switches, GOSHD generates false alarms. In order to be safe
and fairly conservative, we profiled the guest OS to determine the maximum
scheduling time slice, and set the threshold to be twice the profiled time. The
numbers are usually on the order of milliseconds, or at most seconds, and are
quicker compared to other hang detection techniques, such as heartbeat, or
timer watchdogs, which frequently have detection times on the order of tens
of seconds or minutes.
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4.1.3 Functional Evaluation
Experimental Setup
The experiments were conducted on a guest VM with two vCPUs and 1024MiB
of RAM. For the guest OS, we used the default build of SUSE Enterprise
Linux Server 11 SP1, with and without kernel preemption enabled. The pro-
filed maximum scheduling timeslice in both cases was two seconds, and hence
the hang detection threshold was set to four seconds.
Experimental Methodology
In order to assess the hang detection capabilities of GOSHD, we used the fault
injection framework proposed in [47]. As indicated in [47], one of the com-
mon causes of system hangs is improper implementation and invocation of
locking mechanisms (e.g., spinlocks, reader/writer locks) that protect access
to shared data structures in the kernel. Based on those findings, the au-
thors of [47] identified four causes of hang failures: missing spinlock releases,
wrong spinlock orderings, missing unlock/lock pairs, and missing interrupt
state restorations. We further extended that concept to inject transient and
persistent faults. A transient fault is only activated once when the fault lo-
cation is first executed. Conversely, a persistent fault is activated every time
the fault location is executed. Fault injection was repeated with different
types of workloads running on the guest system:
• Hanoi Tower: “Tower of Hanoi” recursive program.
• make -j1: serial compilation of libxml.
• make -j2: compilation of libxml with two tasks in parallel.
• HTTP server: serving of an HTTP load from ApacheBench, which
ran on a separate machine.
The first step of a fault injection experiment is to identify the injection lo-
cation(s). We chose to inject faults into core functions of the Linux kernel
and into frequently used kernel modules, such as ext3, char, and block. By
profiling the kernel using the above workloads, we identified 374 locations on
the execution path of the kernel to inject faults.
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For each fault location, we started from a clean VM and then injected a
fault while running the workload. There were five possible outcomes from
each injection:
• Not Manifested: The fault was injected, but no observable failure
was detected.
• Not Detected: A fault was injected, the VM was non-responsive but
GOSHD did not report a vCPU hang.
• Not Activated: A fault was injected, but the workload did not exe-
cute the code that contained the fault.
• Partial Hang: At least one vCPU was still operational after 10 min-
utes (roughly twice the longest failure-free execution of the workloads)
from the time a hang was detected on another vCPU.
• Full Hang: All vCPUs hung within 10 minutes after hang was detected
on the first vCPU.
Detection Coverage Results
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Figure 4.1: Guest OS hang detection coverage.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the detection coverage and percentages of partial
and full hangs detected by GOSHD. About 82% of injected faults manifested
as hangs. Overall, GOSHD missed 24 failures across all experiments, which
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resulted in 14,720 failures (17,952 injections × 0.82 manifested faults) or a
hang detection coverage of 99.8%.
Further analysis of the misclassified failures indicates that the failures were
caused by a fault location that was repeatedly activated by the guest SSH
server, which was used by our external probe to check for false alarms by
GOSHD. As a result, although the SSH probe reported hangs, the kernel
and other processes on the VM still executed normally.
On average, 18% to 26% of faults caused partial hangs on the non-preemptible
and preemptible kernels, respectively. Those significant numbers emphasize
the importance of partial hang detection. In many partial hang cases, the VM
was still accessible from outside (e.g., via SSH connections). That demon-
strates the ineffectiveness of hang detection methods such as heartbeats, as
the process/thread responsible for generating a heartbeat can still be fully
operational and will continue to report that the system is as well.
Transient faults caused slightly more partial hangs than permanent faults
did in single-task workloads (Hanoi Tower and make -j1), but significantly
more partial hangs in concurrent multi-tasking workloads (make -j2 and
HTTP server), because persistent faults can be reactivated and cause more
independent hanging threads.
Kernel preemption does not appear to help prevent a hang due to spin-
locks, as most critical sections in the kernel are non-preemptible. However,
preemption does reduce the number of full hangs. For example, consider two
tasks T1 and T2 sharing a user-level lock lu. While holding lu, task T1 hangs
because of our injection into a kernel spinlock. Task T1 cannot be preempted
because it is executing in a non-preemptible critical section (causing a par-
tial hang). Now let us assume that task T2 attempts to acquire lu. In the
non-preemptible kernel, task T2 will hang as well, thus causing a full hang.
But in the preemptible kernel, task T2 can be preempted, and therefore the
kernel remains in a partial hang.
Detection Latency Results
Detection latency measures how quickly a detector can identify a problem.
GOSHD raises an alarm when it finds that the guest OS scheduler has not
scheduled processes for a predefined time. Therefore, GOSHD’s minimal de-
tection latency is that threshold (four seconds in our experiments). Specifi-
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Figure 4.2: Guest OS hang detection latency. The blue line (with triangle
markers) reflects the latency of detecting the first hang of a two vCPU VM.
The red dashed line (with circle markers) reflects the latency of partial
hangs.
cally, detection latency represents the time between fault activation and the
moment GOSHD raises an alarm. Note that the guest OS is not necessarily
hung at the moment the fault is injected. Figure 4.2 shows the detection
latency of GOSHD for the same set of experiments described previously.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates how partial hang detection helps reduce full hang
detection latency. The blue line (triangles) shows that GOSHD can detect
more than 90% of hangs after four seconds and all hangs within 32 seconds.
Meanwhile, the red line (circles) shows that only 54% of hangs result in a
full hang after four seconds. Many full hangs can be detected tens of seconds
ahead through the use of partial hang detection.
4.2 HRKD – Hidden Rootkit Detection
4.2.1 Threat Model
Rootkits are malicious computer programs created to hide other programs
from system administrators and security monitoring tools. For example,
users cannot see a hidden process or thread via common administrative tools,
such as Task Manager, PS, or TOP. Autonomic security scanning tools can
also be bypassed simply because their inspection lists do not contain the
hidden programs.
There are many existing techniques to hide a process, such as Direct Ker-
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nel Object Manipulation (DKOM) [48], physical memory manipulation [49],
and dynamic kernel code manipulation [45]. For example, using those tech-
niques, a rootkit can stealthily detach the data objects belonging to the
malicious programs from their usual lists (e.g., remove a task struct object
from Linux’s task list). Therefore, a normal list traversal cannot reveal the
detached object. As exemplified by previous studies [16, 45, 17], well-crafted
rootkits can escape the detection of guest OS invariant-based scanning tools.
4.2.2 Detection Technique
Our HRKD module employs the context switch monitoring (Section 3.3.1)
methods to inspect every process/thread that uses the vCPU, regardless
of how kernel objects are manipulated. Each time a process or a thread is
scheduled to use CPUs, it is intercepted by the module for further inspection.
This interception defeats hidden malware; it puts malicious programs back
on the inspection list.
Furthermore, HRKD uses architectural invariants to reliably infer the in-
tercepted thread’s state. Without architectural invariants, the inspection
must start from an OS state, e.g., the head of the task list, which may
already be circumvented by a rootkit. With architectural invariants, the in-
spection starts from an architectural state, e.g., the TR or RSP registers,
which directly point to the data structures used by hardware to execute each
thread or process.
In order to detect a hidden user process or thread, the process counting
algorithm (Fig. 3.1A) or thread switch interception algorithm (Fig. 3.1B) can
be used. These algorithms are independent of the method by which the
guest OS manages process-related data structures, because they rely only
on architectural invariants. Inspection starts from the CR3 or TR registers.
Therefore, the observed number of processes always reflects the exact number
of running processes. This is a trusted view that can be cross-validated
against other views, e.g., a view from existing VMI tools or views from in-
guest utilities, which may be the target of rootkits. Discrepancies between
these views reveal the presence of hidden user processes and threads.
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4.2.3 How Can a Rootkit Hide from HRKD?
A rootkit can hide from our HRKD by suppressing CR3 access (for user-level
rootkits) or RSP0 access (for kernel-level rootkits) VM Exits. It can do so by
reusing the CR3 (virtual address space) or RSP0 (kernel stack) of an existing
process or kernel thread. Such attacks are called code injection attacks, which
are not actually rootkits. Nevertheless, our HRKD is not designed to detect
this class of attack.
4.2.4 Functional Evaluation
We tested HRKD on a variety of OSes and HRKD detected the presence
of malware against all tested real-world rootkits.1 On Windows, the tested
rootkits included FU, HideProc, AFX, HideToolz, HE4Hook, and BH. HRKD’s
process counting technique showed additional processes beyond those re-
ported by the Task Manager. On Linux, HRKD was able to discover all
tested kernel-level rootkits: Ivyl’s, Enyelkm 1.2, SucKIT, and PhalanX. Ta-
ble 4.1 summarizes the results.
Since HRKD’s process counting technique relies only on architectural in-
variants, it worked properly for all tested OSes, namely Windows XP, Vista,
7, and Server 2008, and various distributions of Linux kernel 2.6, without
any adjustment. In addition, the detection capability of that technique was
not affected by the implementation or strategy used by rootkits. In fact, the
rootkits we evaluated employed a variety of hiding techniques, ranging from
DKOM to system call hijacking (see Table 4.1). Thus, HRKD will be able
to detect future hidden rootkits, even if they use novel hiding mechanisms.
4.3 PED – Privilege Escalation Detection
4.3.1 The Three Ninjas
Ninja [19] is a real-world privilege escalation detection system that uses pas-
sive monitoring. Ninja is included in the mainline repository for major
1We modified some rootkits’ source code so they could work properly on our tested OS versions.
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Table 4.1: Real-world rootkits evaluated with HRKD (All were detected)
Rootkit Target OS Hiding Technique(s)
FU Win XP, Vista DKOM
HideProc Win XP, Vista DKOM
AFX Win XP, Vista Hijack system calls
HideToolz Win XP, Vista, 7 Hijack system calls
HE4Hook Win XP Hijack system calls
BH-Rookit-NT Win XP, Vista Hijack system calls
Ivyl’s Rootkit Linux >2.6.29 Hijack system calls
Enyelkm 1.2 Linux 2.6 kmem, Hijack system calls
SucKIT Linux 2.6 kmem, DKOM
PhalanX Linux 2.6 kmem, DKOM
Linux distributions, including Debian variants like Ubuntu. Ninja period-
ically scans the process list to identify if a root process has a parent process
that is not from an authorized user (i.e., not defined in Ninja’s “magic”
group). If so, the root process is flagged as privilege-escalated. Ninja option-
ally terminates such processes to prevent further damage to the system. In
order to avoid mistakenly killing setuid/setgid processes, Ninja allows users
to create a “white list” of legitimate executables that are not subjected to its
checking rules. The interval between checks is configurable (1s by default).
We implement HT-Ninja, which utilizes HyperTap for detecting privilege
escalation attacks. We reuse the OS-level Ninja’s checking rules when looking
for unauthorized processes and make the following changes:
Transform passive monitoring to active monitoring. We define the fol-
lowing events at which a process is checked: (i) first context switch of each
process ; and (ii) every I/O-related system call (e.g., open, read, write, and
lseek). That ensures that we check before any unauthorized actions, e.g., file
or network, are conducted.
Using architectural invariants. The original Ninja uses Linux’s /proc
filesystem to obtain information about running processes. HT-Ninja uses
only hardware state, such as the TR and CR3 registers, to identify current
running processes. HT-Ninja derives OS-specific information, such as User
ID (uid) and Effective User ID (euid), from the TSS structure and RSP regis-
ter, which can be combined to obtain the exact thread info and task struct
objects of each process.
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4.3.2 Functional Evaluation
Illustrating Attacks on Ninja
Vulnerable
Safe
Monitoring Interval Audit
Monitoring IntervalAttack
Log
Log
Attack
Audit
Attack
Auditing
Logging
Figure 4.3: Top: Transient attack, the attacker attacks when a passive
monitor is not logging. Bottom: Spamming attack, the attacker causes an
attack to go undetected by creating extra work for both the logger and
auditor.
Here, we intend to use Ninja only to demonstrate the limitations of pas-
sive monitoring, and are not criticizing its checking rules. We evaluated two
passive-monitoring versions of Ninja: an original in-OS version (O-Ninja) and
our modified version (H-Ninja), which was implemented at the hypervisor-
level using traditional VMI. Later on, we will compare those two implemen-
tations against our active monitoring HT-Ninja. But first, we demonstrate
four attacks that can bypass passive monitoring mechanisms:
Transient attacks : We used two real privilege escalation exploits, namely
a glibc vulnerability (CVE-2010-3847) [50] and a kernel out-of-bounds er-
ror (CVE-2013-1763) [51] to obtain a terminal with root privileges. Ninja
can easily detect the privilege escalated terminal if it remains in the system.
However, when we terminated a process right after it finished an operation
(e.g., copying sensitive data), both Ninja versions were unaware of the exis-
tence of the terminal, as its lifetime was short. See the top of Fig. 4.3 for an
illustration.
Side channel attacks : We exploited the Linux /proc file system as a side
channel [52] to determine Ninja’s monitoring interval and when each check
would be performed. Specifically, the file /proc/PID/stat allowed us to
determine the current state of a process (e.g., Sleep or Running) and the
current instruction pointer (EIP). By observing Ninja’s process state, we
could accurately measure the monitoring interval, i.e., how long Ninja was
in the Sleep state and when the next check would be performed. With the
measured interval and checking time, we could launch transient attacks that
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Table 4.2: Predicting Ninja’s monitoring interval (seconds)
Ninja’s Interval Predicted Mean Min Max SD
1 1.00039 1.00006 1.00367 0.00071
2 2.00023 1.99998 2.00164 0.00038
4 4.00025 3.99986 4.00189 0.00040
8 8.00025 7.99951 8.00126 0.00035
avoided detection. However, that particular strategy did not work on H-
Ninja, as it does not generate a /proc file in the target VM. Table 4.2 shows
result of a trial of this method, in which each interval was sampled 30 times.
Rootkit combined attacks : In a more substantial attack, we combined a
privilege escalation exploit with a rootkit, which was able to hide processes.
After the terminal was escalated, we immediately ran the rootkit to prevent
Ninja from discovering the presence of the terminal, bypassing both versions
of Ninja.
Spamming attacks : We increased the execution time of the function that
iterated over the process list by launching a large number of valid processes
together with one privilege escalated process. The purpose was to increase
the scanning time so that the escalated process can complete before the scan
reached it. Note that a blocking H-Ninja is protected against this attack.
See the bottom of Fig. 4.3 for an illustration.
Active Monitoring with HT-Ninja
To show the benefits of HyperTap’s active monitoring mechanism, we com-
pared the detectability of the three versions of Ninja (O-Ninja, H-Ninja, and
HT-Ninja) against real exploits, coupled with the attack strategies described
in Section 4.3.2. It is worth mentioning that both O-Ninja and H-Ninja
are vulnerable to DKOM rootkits, e.g., SucKIT, because they only use OS
invariants.
Our experiments showed that O-Ninja with a 0-second checking interval
was quickly defeated by a privilege escalation exploit CVE-2013-1763 [51]
combined with spamming and a rootkit.2 The attack was performed as fol-
lows: (i) a number of idle processes were created; (ii) the exploit code was
2https://github.com/ivyl/rootkit
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run to grant root privileges to the current process; and (iii) with root priv-
ileges, the rootkit was installed to remove the escalated process from the
process list. We repeated the attack 300 times and have timed the attack to
take ∼4ms on an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU E8400 3GHz CPU. Without
creating extra processes on a system with 31 processes running, O-Ninja can
detect ∼10% attacks. When we introduced 100 idle processes, the detec-
tion probability was reduced to single-digit percentages (between 2 and 3%).
With 200 or more idle processes, O-Ninja cannot detect any attacks (with
the exception of outliers  1%).
To test H-Ninja, we used the same privilege escalation + rootkit combi-
nation as with O-Ninja. Since the attack was quick, a small value for the
checking interval was needed. With an interval of 4 ms, H-Ninja could detect
100% of the attacks, and the detection dropped to near 60% at 8 ms. With
an interval > 20 ms, the detection probability became < 5%.
Although an attacker with no access to side channels must rely on a certain
amount of luck to defeat O-Ninja and H-Ninja, his/her probability of success
can be increased by spamming (O-Ninja) or by reasoning that administrators
would not wish to incur the penalty of scanning the process tree with a
frequency in the single-digit milliseconds. Also, the speed of the attack at
4 ms was extremely na¨ıve; a more sophisticated attacker should be able to
do better.
Since it uses active monitoring, HT-Ninja was able to detect all attacks in
all tested scenarios.
A main limitation of HT-Ninja, as well as O-Ninja and H-Ninja, is that
they do not detect privilege escalation attacks that occur within the context
of “white listed” processes. Those processes, many of which are setuid pro-
grams, are ignored by Ninja. An attack that compromises (e.g., using buffer
overflow) and executes malicious code within the context of a white listed
process would not be detected.
4.4 Other Uses of HyperTap
The logging capabilities presented in Section 3.3 can also be used to imple-
ment a wide variety of RnS monitors. For example, there is a class of security
tools that depend on system call interception [53, 54, 55]. Failure detection
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based on machine learning, e.g. [40], can be applied to the events and states
logged by HyperTap.
HyperTap could also be incorporated into the runtime memory safety tech-
nique proposed in [56]. That technique consists of two steps: (i) compiler
analysis and instrumentation, to guide (ii) runtime memory safety checking.
The latter step requires OS modification to intercept privileged operations,
e.g., MMIO, MMU configuration, and context switching [57]. Since Hyper-
Tap supports those interceptions without altering the guest OS, it shows
promise for being integrated with runtime checking. Such incorporation
would allow a variety of RnS detectors to be implemented, such as detec-
tors for silent data corruption, buffer overflow, and code injection. We leave
that integration for future work.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
We conducted experiments to measure the performance overhead of individ-
ual HyperTap auditors as well as the combined overhead of running multiple
auditors. We measured the runtime of the UnixBench3 performance bench-
mark when (i) each auditor was enabled, and (ii) all three auditors are en-
abled. The target VM was a SUSE 11 Linux VM with 2 vCPUs and 1GiB of
RAM. The host computer ran SUSE 11 Linux and the KVM hypervisor, with
an 8 core Intel i5 3.07GHz processor and 8 GiB of RAM. The results were
illustrated in Figure 4.4. The baseline is the execution time when running
the workloads in the VM without HyperTap integrated, and the reported
numbers are the average of five runs of the workloads.
In most cases, the performance overhead of running all three auditors si-
multaneously was (i) only slightly higher than that of running the slowest
auditor, HT-Ninja, individually, and (ii) substantially lower than the sum-
mation of the individual overheads of all auditors. That result demonstrates
the benefits of HyperTap’s unified logging mechanism.
For the Disk I/O and CPU intensive workloads, all three auditors together
produced less than 5% and 2% performance losses, respectively. The Disk
I/O intensive workloads appear to have incurred more overhead than CPU
intensive workloads because they generated more VM Exit events, at which
3http://code.google.com/p/byte-unixbench/
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Figure 4.4: Measured performance overhead of HyperTap sample monitors.
The workloads are run with three different configurations: 1) Both HRKD
and HT-Ninja, 2) only HT-Ninja, and 3) only HRKD. Error bars indicate
one standard deviation.
point some monitoring code was triggered.
For the context switching and system call micro-benchmarks, all three au-
ditors together induced about 10% (or less) and 19% performance losses,
respectively. It is important to note that those micro-benchmarks were de-
signed to measure the performance of individual specific operations without
any useful processing; they do not necessarily represent the performance over-
head of general applications. The relatively high overhead was caused by the
HyperTap routines enabled for logging those benchmarked operations. Since
only HT-Ninja needs to log system calls, it was the primary source of the
overhead in the system call micro-benchmark case.
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4.6 Conclusion
The feasibility of the HyperTap framework was demonstrated through the
implementation and evaluation of three monitors: Guest OS Hang Detec-
tion, Hidden RootKit Detection, and Privilege Escalation Detection. In all
cases, the use of architectural invariants was central to the high quality and
performance observed in the experiments. We presented additional analysis
of the method so that other reliability and security monitors can be built on
top of the HyperTap framework.
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CHAPTER 5
HPROBES: DYNAMIC VIRTUAL
MACHINE MONITORING USING
HYPERVISOR PROBES
This chapter introduces Hprobe, a framework that allows one to dynamically
monitor applications and operating systems inside a VM. The Hprobe frame-
work does not require any changes to the guest OS, which avoids the tight
coupling of monitoring with its target. Furthermore, the monitors can be
customized and enabled/disabled while the VM is running.
5.1 Introduction
The HyperTap framework introduced in the previous chapters provides an
efficient and hard-to-bypass event-driven monitoring mechanism. The key
design of HyperTap is the reliance on a fixed set of hardware architectural
invariants to capture guest OS’s activities. While we have shown that this
monitoring capability is effective to support an important set of reliability
and security monitoring policies (see Chapter 4 for examples of the evaluated
policies), there are still many cases in which monitors requires a more flexible
means to place monitoring points, or hooks, to capture specific guest OS and
applications’ operational activities.
One class of active monitoring systems is a hook-based system, where the
monitor places hooks inside the target application or OS [13]. A hook is a
mechanism used to generate an event when the target executes a particular
instruction. When the target’s execution reaches the hook, control is trans-
ferred to the monitoring system where it can record the event and/or inspect
the system’s state. Once the monitor has finished processing the event, it
returns control to the target system and execution continues until the next
event. Hook-based techniques are robust against failures and attacks inside
the target when the monitoring system is properly isolated from the target
system.
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We find dynamic hook-based systems attractive for dependability moni-
toring as they can be easily adapted: once the hook delivery mechanism is
functional, implementing a new monitor involves adding a hook location and
deciding how to process the event. In this case, dynamic refers to the ability
to add and remove hooks without disrupting the control flow of the target.
This is particularly important in real-world use, where monitoring needs to
be configured for multiple applications and operational environments. In
addition to supporting a variety of environments, monitoring must also be
responsive to changes in those environments.
In this chapter, we present the Hprobe framework, a dynamic hook-based
VM reliability and security monitoring solution. The key contributions of
the Hprobe framework are that it: is loosely coupled from the target VM,
can inspect both the OS and user applications, and it supports runtime
insertion/removal of hooks. All of these aspects result in a VM monitoring
solution that is suitable for running on an actual production system. We have
built a prototype implementation using hardware-assisted virtualization that
is integrated with the KVM hypervisor [6]. From our experiments, the over-
head for an individual probe (the time between hook invocation and when
control is returned to the VM) is 2.6 µs on a modern server-class CPU. To
demonstrate monitoring using the Hprobe framework, we have constructed
an emergency security vulnerability detector, a heartbeat detector, and an
infinite loop detector. While our prototype framework shares some similar-
ities and builds on previous monitoring systems, these detectors could not
have been implemented on any existing platform. All of these detectors were
tested using real applications and exhibit low overhead (≤ 5%).
5.2 Design
5.2.1 Hook-Based Monitoring
An illustration of a hook-based monitoring system adapted from the formal
model presented in Lares [13] is shown in Figure 5.1. Hook-based monitor-
ing involves a monitor takes control of the target after the target reaches a
hook. In the case of hypervisor-based VM monitoring, the target is a virtual
machine and the monitor can run in either the hypervisor [10], in a sepa-
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Figure 5.1: Hook-based monitoring. A hook triggers based on event e and
control is transferred to the monitor through notification N . The monitor
processes e with a behavior B and returns control to the target with a
response R.
rate security VM [13], or in the same VM [30]. Regardless of the separation
mechanism used, one must ensure that the monitor is resilient to tampering
from within the target VM and the monitor has access to all relevant state
of that VM (e.g., hardware, memory, etc.). Furthermore, a VM monitoring
system should be able to trigger on the execution of any instruction, be it in
the guest OS or in an application.
If a monitoring system can capture all relevant events, it also follows that
the monitoring system should be dynamic. This is important in the fast-
changing landscape of IT security and reliability. As new vulnerabilities and
bugs are discovered, one will inevitably need to account for them. The value
of a static monitoring system decreases drastically over time unless periodic
software updates are issued. However, in many VM monitoring solutions [8,
14, 13, 30], such software updates would require a hypervisor reboot or at
the very least a guest OS reboot. These reboots result in system downtime
whenever the monitor needs to be adapted. In many production systems,
this additional downtime is unacceptable, particularly when the schedule
is unpredictable (e.g., security vulnerabilities). Dynamic monitors can also
provide performance improvement over statically configured monitoring: one
can monitor only event of interest vs. a general class of events (e.g., a single
system call vs. all system calls). Furthermore, it is possible to construct
dynamic detectors that change during execution (e.g., a hook can be used to
add or remove other hooks). Static monitoring systems also present a subtle
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design flaw: a configuration change in the monitoring system can affect the
control flow of the target system (e.g., by requiring a restart).
In line with dynamism and loose coupling with the target system, the
detector must also be simple in its implementation. If a system is overly
complex and difficult to extend, the value of that system is drastically reduced
as much effort needs to be expended to use that system. In fact, such a system
will simply not be used. DNSSEC1 and SELinux2 can serve as instructive
examples: while they provide valuable security features (e.g., authentication
and access control), both of these systems were released around the year
2000 and to this day are still disabled in many environments. Furthermore,
a simpler implementation should yield a smaller attack surface [58].
5.2.2 Design Principles
In light of the observation made in the previous section, we set the following
design principles for a dynamic VM active monitoring system:
1. Protection: Monitoring should be impervious to attacks (e.g., hook
circumvention) inside the VM. The authors of Lares [13] outline a for-
mal model with potential attacks and security requirements for a hook-
based monitoring system. Those requirements using the notation in
Fig. 5.1 are: the notification N should only be triggered on legitimate
events, the state of the target should not change during monitoring,
an attacker cannot modify the behavior B of the monitor, and the
response R cannot be avoided by the target.
2. Simplicity: The monitoring system should be simple to implement
and extend. In order to ease adoption and support cloud environments,
it should not require any modification of the guest OS.
3. Dynamism: The monitoring system should be loosely coupled with
the target. The target itself should be protected from changes in the
monitoring system: reconfiguration can be expected to affect execution
time, but it should not disrupt the control flow of the target (e.g.,
require a reboot or application restart). Furthermore, it should be
possible to insert the hooks into both the target OS and its applications.
1https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2535
2https://www.nsa.gov/public info/press room/2001/se-linux.shtml
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4. Performance: The monitoring system should have acceptable over-
head for use in a production system.
We use these requirements as a guide to design a hook-based hypervisor
monitoring framework that we call hypervisor probes or Hprobes. The hyper-
visor provides a convenient interface for isolating monitoring from the VM
while maintaining full access to the target VM. The proposed framework
allows one to insert and remove hooks into arbitrary locations inside the
guest’s memory (i.e., both the guest OS and user applications) at runtime.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework, we build a prototype and
three monitors. Two of the monitors implement reliability techniques, and
the third illustrates the simplicity of using Hprobes to rapidly produce a
monitor that protects against a security vulnerability.
5.3 Prototype Implementation
5.3.1 Review Debugging with Software Interrupt int3
The x86 architecture offers multiple methods for inserting breakpoints, which
are used in our prototype framework. We focus on the int3 instruction
as it is flexible and is not limited in the number of breakpoints that can
be set. The int3 instruction is a single byte opcode (0xcc) that raises a
breakpoint exception (#BP). A debugger uses OS provided functionality (e.g.,
a system call like ptrace() [59] in Linux) to control and inspect the process
being debugged. In order to insert a breakpoint, a debugger overwrites the
instruction at the desired location with int3, and then saves the original
instruction. When the breakpoint is hit and the #BP exception is generated,
the OS catches the exception and notifies the debugger. At this point, the
debugger has control of the process and can inspect the process’s memory or
control its execution, e.g., by single-stepping over subsequent instructions.
More details can be found in Chapter 17 of the Intel Software Developer’s
Manual [4].
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Figure 5.2: Hprobes integrated with the KVM hypervisor. The Event
Forwarder has been added to KVM and communicates with a separate
kernel agent through Helper APIs. Detectors can either be implemented as
kernel modules in the Host OS or in user space by communicating with the
kernel agent through ioctl functions.
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probe hit
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Figure 5.3: A probe hit in the Hprobe prototype. Right-facing arrows are
VM Exits and left-facing arrows are VM Entries. When int3 is executed,
the hypervisor takes control. The hypervisor optionally executes a probe
handler (probefunc()) and places the CPU into single-step mode. It then
executes the original instruction and does a VM Entry to resume the VM.
After the guest executes the original instruction, it traps back into the
hypervisor and the hypervisor will write the int3 before allowing the VM to
continue as usual.
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5.3.2 Integration with KVM
The Hprobe prototype was inspired by the Linux kernel profiling feature
kprobes [60], which has been used for real-time system analysis [61]. The
operating principle behind our prototype is to use VM Exits to trap the VM’s
execution and transfer control to monitoring functionality in the hypervisor.
This implementation leverages hardware-assisted virtualization (HAV), and
the prototype framework is built on the KVM hypervisor [6]. The prototype’s
architecture is shown in Figure 5.2. The modifications to KVM itself make
up the Event Forwarder, which is a set of callbacks inserted into KVM’s VM
Exit handlers. The Event Forwarder communicates with a separate hprobe
kernel agent using Helper APIs. The hprobe kernel agent is a loadable kernel
module that is the workhorse of the framework. The kernel agent provides
an interface to detectors for inserting and removing probes. This interface is
accessible by kernel modules through a kernel API in the host OS (which is
also the hypervisor since KVM itself is a kernel module) or by user programs
via an ioctl interface.
The execution of an Hprobe based detector is illustrated in Figure 5.3 and
Figure 5.4. A probe is added by rewriting the instruction in memory at
the target address with int3, saving the original instruction, and adding the
target address to a doubly-linked list of active probes. This process happens
at runtime and requires no application or guest OS restart. As explained
in Section 5.3.1, the int3 instruction generates an exception when executed.
With HAV properly configured, this exception generates a VM Exit event,
at which point the hypervisor intervenes (Step 1). The hypervisor uses the
Event Forwarder to pass the exception to the Hprobe kernel agent, which
traverses the list of active probes and verifies that the int3 was generated by
an Hprobe. If so, the Hprobe kernel agent reports the event and optionally
calls an hprobe handler function that can be associated with the probe. If the
exception does not belong to an Hprobe (e.g., it was generated by running gdb
or kprobes inside the VM), the int3 is passed back to KVM to be handled as
usual. Each Hprobe handler performs a user-defined monitoring function and
runs in the Host OS. When the handler returns (a deferred work mechanism
can also be used to support non-blocking probes, if desired), the hypervisor
replaces the int3 instruction with the original opcode and put the CPU
in single-step mode. Once the original instruction executes, a single-step
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(#DB) exception is generated, causing another VM Exit event [4] (Step 2).
At this point, the Hprobe kernel agent rewrites the int3, performs a VM
Entry, and the VM resumes its execution (Step 3). This single-step and
instruction rewrite process ensures that the probe is always caught. If one
wishes to protect the probes from being overwritten by the guest, the page
containing the probe can be write-protected. Although this prototype was
implemented using KVM, the concept will extend to any hypervisor that can
trap on similar exceptions. Note that instead of int3, we could use any other
instruction that generates VM Exits (e.g., hypercall, illegal instruction, etc.).
We chose int3 since it is well supported and has a single-byte opcode.
...
pushl %eax
incl %eax
decl %ebx
...
Original
...
pushl %eax
int3
decl %ebx
...
Step 1
...
pushl %eax
incl %eax
decl %ebx
...
Step 2
...
pushl %eax
int3
decl %ebx
...
Step 3
Figure 5.4: Assembly pseudocode demonstrating what an Hprobe looks like
in the VM’s memory before adding a probe (left frame) and during a probe
hit (right three frames). The dashed box indicates the VM’s current
instruction.
5.3.3 Building Detectors
As mentioned in the previous section, Hprobes can be controlled via an ioctl
interface or a kernel API. Both interfaces distinguish between probes that are
inserted into guest kernel space and guest user space. That is because while
the OS always maps the kernel space pages at the same address for all virtual
address spaces, each user program has its own set of pages. User space probes
require the Page Directory Base Address (from the CR3 register on x86) to
translate a guest virtual address into a guest physical address. Once we know
the guest physical address, we can overwrite the instruction at that address
and insert probes into the address space of a particular process. However,
the mapping of an OS-level construct like a running process to hardware
paging structures is not readily available from the hypervisor due to the
semantic gap between the VM and the hypervisor. Therefore, we use libVMI
to obtain the value of the CR3 register corresponding to the target process’s
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virtual address space [62]. This allows us to translate the virtual address of
a probe location (which can be obtained from dynamic/static analysis, or by
inspecting the application’s symbol table) to a guest physical address that
can be used to add a probe.
If one wishes to insert a probe into a user application, however, there exists
another challenge. Unlike the guest OS, the pages of a running application’s
code may not be resident in memory at all times. That is, during an applica-
tion’s lifetime, some of its code may reside on disk. When execution reaches
a page that is not resident, the OS will bring that page into memory. This
means that the hypervisor may not be able to insert probes directly into all
locations of the program at all times (i.e., it would have to wait for the OS to
bring certain pages into memory). This situation arises particularly during
application startup. In this case, the OS uses a demand paging mechanism in
which the pages belonging to the application reside on disk until the applica-
tion attempts to access one of those pages. Therefore, if the page containing
the target location for a probe has not yet been accessed, a translation for
guest physical address to guest virtual address will not exist. In order to
support probes for user programs, this situation must be resolved so that the
Hprobe framework can guarantee that once a probe has been added through
the APIs, it will get called on the next invocation of the instruction at the
probe’s desired location.
One approach to solving the problem of having target code paged out is
to wait until the OS naturally brings the necessary page into memory. As
mentioned in Section 2.2, recent versions of x86 hardware assisted virtualiza-
tion (HAV) use two-dimensional page tables, and do not require VM Exits
for all page table updates. Therefore, in order to trap a page table update
when using EPT, one must remove access permissions from EPT entries to
induce an EPT VIOLATION VM Exit event. In this case, we remove write per-
missions from the guest physical page corresponding to the guest page table
entry that refers to the guest virtual page for the intended probe location.
We remind the reader that in this case the page itself is not yet present in
the guest OS, and therefore a translation from guest virtual address to guest
physical address does not exist in the guest OS paging structures. When
an EPT violation corresponding to our protected guest page table entry
occurs (indicating that the page containing the probe location is now in mem-
ory), we put the CPU into single-step mode. After the instruction writing
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to the guest page table executes, we can insert the probe by performing the
usual translations and traversing the guest paging structures. This process
of using page protection to insert probes into non-resident locations is de-
scribed in Figure 5.5. Note that we could improve performance slightly by
avoiding the single-step and decoding the trapped instruction that caused
the EPT VIOLATION. In practice, however, this paged-out situation only oc-
curs once during the lifetime of the program (unless a page is swapped out,
in which case disk latency would dominate VM Exit latency) and the per-
formance gain would be negligible.
Translate
GVA to GPA
Translation
present?
Add probe
Set write
protect on
Guest PTE
Single-step
Guest
PTE write
Yes No
EPT violation on
PTE write attempt
PTE written after instruction executes
Figure 5.5: How a user space probe is added. A guest virtual address
(GVA) for the probe’s location must be translated into a guest physical
address (GPA). If the translation fails because the page is not present, we
write protect the EPT page containing the guest page table entry (PTE)
for that GVA. When the guest OS attempts to update the guest page table,
the Hprobe kernel agent is notified via an EPT violation and sets single
step mode. After the single-step, the translation succeeds, and the probe is
added.
Often times when monitoring, it is necessary to not only be aware of events
in the VM (e.g., an instruction at a particular address was executed), but also
the state of the VM (e.g., registers, flags, etc...). When inserting an hprobe
from within the hypervisor (i.e., using a kernel module in the Host OS), the
hprobe kernel agent passes a pointer to a structure containing vCPU state to
the hprobe handler. These privileged probe handlers can use this structure
to decode additional information or possibly modify the state of the VM to
mitigate a failure or vulnerability.
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5.3.4 Discussion
Our use of int3 to generate an exception utilizes hardware enforcement of
event generation: there is no dependence on any functionality inside the guest
OS. This allows the hprobe hooking mechanism to be used on any guest OS
supported by the hypervisor. Since the majority of the work is done outside
of the hypervisor modifications (i.e., all of the heavy lifting is done inside of
the kernel agent), the system can be ported to other hypervisors that support
trapping on int3.
When reflecting on the requirements set forth in Section 5.2, we observe
that the hprobe framework satisfies those requirements:
1. Protection: By using an out-of-VM approach that is enforced by
HAV, our hooks cannot be circumvented. Furthermore, we can use
memory protection in the hypervisor to prevent probes from being
modified (or hide them by read protecting them).
2. Simplicity: Modifications to introduce the Event Forwarder and Helper
APIs to KVM add only 117 source-lines-of-code (SLOC) and the kernel
agent is 703 SLOC. The simple API allows monitors to be developed
quickly and most detectors can be based on a common template (e.g.,
build one detector by reusing a majority of the code from a previous
one). As an anecdotal example, most of the example detectors pre-
sented in Section 5.4 required only two hours of programming to be
fully functional. Hprobes can be used on an unmodified guest OS.
3. Dynamism: Our API allows for the insertion and removal of probes
at runtime without disrupting the control flow of the target VM. Fur-
thermore, unique to hook-based VM monitoring systems, we support
application level monitoring through user space probes.
4. Performance: While we require multiple VM Exits, we find that for
our test applications and use cases, the performance is acceptable and
worth the value added in the previous two dimensions. See Section 5.5
for analysis and details.
This prototype satisfies the protection requirements adapted from Lares [13]
in Section 5.2.2. The notification N is only delivered if events occur legiti-
mately (spurious int3s are ignored by the kernel agent). The context infor-
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mation of the event (the VM’s state at event e) cannot be modified during
hprobe processing since the hypervisor is in control. The security application
(e.g., a probefunc()) runs inside the hypervisor and therefore, its behavior
B cannot be altered by the VM. Additionally, the effects of any response R
from the hypervisor are enforced since the hypervisor has full control over the
target VM. Since hprobes configure VM Exits to occur on int3, one could
imagine a Denial-of-Service (DOS) attack based on causing VM Exits using
spurious int3 instructions. We note that hprobes do not present a new DOS
threat and that if an attacker were interested in such an attack, he or she can
perform it using existing functionality (e.g., using the vmcall instruction).
While using the hprobe framework does require modifications to the hy-
pervisor, these modifications are small and robust across multiple versions
of KVM and the Linux kernel. During the course of this project, we used
the diff-match-patch libraries3 to migrate the Event Forwarder and Helper
APIs between KVM versions. We have tested hprobes on OpenSUSE 11.2,
CENTOS7, Gentoo with kernel version 3.18.7, Ubuntu 12.04, and Ubuntu
14.04. The hprobe kernel agent is written to be version agnostic (e.g., with
#ifdef macros for kernel version specific constructs like unlocked ioctl).
5.3.5 Limitations
This prototype is useful for a large class of monitoring use cases, however it
does have a few limitations. Namely,
1. Hprobes only trigger on instruction execution. If one is interested in
monitoring data access events (e.g., trigger every time a particular ad-
dress is read from/written to), hprobes do not provide a clean way to
do so. One would need to place a probe at every instruction that mod-
ifies the data (potentially every instruction that modifies any data if
addresses are affected by user input). More cleanly, one could use an
hprobe at the beginning and end of a critical section to turn on and
off page protection for data relevant to that critical section, capturing
the events in a manner similar to livewire [8], but with the flexibility
of hprobes. We are considering this in future work.
3https://pypi.python.org/pypi/diff-match-patch/
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2. Hprobes leverage VM Exits, resulting in non-optimal performance.
This tradeoff is worth the simpler, more robust implementation with
its trust rooted in HAV.
3. Probes cannot be fully hidden from the VM. Even with clever EPT
tricks to hide the existence of a probe when reading from its location,
a timing side channel would still exist since an attacker could observe
that the probed instruction takes longer than expected to complete.
5.4 Detectors
In this section, we present sample reliability and security detectors built upon
the hprobe prototype framework. These detectors are unique to the hprobe
framework and cannot be implemented on any other current VM monitoring
system.
5.4.1 Emergency Exploit Detector
Most systems operators fear zero-day vulnerabilities as there is little that
can be done about them until the vendor/maintainer of the software releases
a fix. Furthermore, even after a vulnerability is made public, a patch takes
time to be developed and must be put through a QA cycle. This can further
be exacerbated in environments with high availability concerns and stringent
change control requirements: even if a patch is available, many times it is not
possible to restart the system or service until a regular maintenance window.
This leaves operators with a difficult decision: risk damage from restarting a
system with a new patch or risk damage from running an unpatched system.
Consider the CVE-2008-0600 vulnerability that was resulted in a local root
exploit through the vmsplice() system call [63, 64]. This example represents
a highly dangerous buffer overflow since a successful exploit allows one to
arbitrarily execute code in ring 0 using a program that is publicly available
on the Internet. Since this exploit involves the base kernel code (i.e., not a
loadable module), patching it would require installing a new kernel followed
by a system reboot (or without a reboot using techniques such as [65, 66]).
As discussed earlier, in many operational cases a system reboot or OS patch
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can only be conducted during a predetermined maintenance window. Fur-
thermore, many organizations would be hesitant to run a fresh kernel image
on production systems without having gone through a proper testing cycle
first.
The vmsplice() system call is used to perform a zero-copy map of user
memory into a pipe. At a high level, the CVE-2008-0600 vmsplice() con-
structs specially crafted compound page structures in userspace. A com-
pound page is a structure that allows one to treat a set of pages as a single
data structure. Every compound page structure has a pointer to a destruc-
tor function that handles the cleanup of those underlying pages. The exploit
works by using an integer overflow to corrupt the kernel stack such that it
references the compound page structures crafted in userspace. Before calling
vmsplice(), the exploit closes the pipe, so that when the system call runs
it deallocates the pages, resulting in calling the compound pages’ destructor
function. The destructor is set to privilege escalation shellcode that allows
an attacker to hijack the system.
The CVE-2008-0600 exploit hinges on an integer overflow in one of the sys-
tem call arguments - a pointer to a struct iovec that contains the member
iov len, which is set to ULONG MAX by the exploit. Since Linux uses registers
to hold the system call number as well as arguments for system calls [67],
we could use classical system call monitoring/tracing tools to detect this ex-
ploit [68, 55]. We can watch whenever a system call is invoked and check
for the correct system call number and parse arguments to detect an integer
overflow attempt. However, since hprobes are dynamic, we can set a probe
to trigger only on the sys vmsplice() function (that is called after the sys-
tem call assembly linkage). This ensures that only the execution path of the
vmsplice() system call is inspected as opposed to all system calls (as in tra-
ditional system call tracing). At this point in the system call invocation, the
function just uses the regular compiler function calling convention (in most
instances of the Linux kernel, the gcc convention) and the arguments are on
the stack. Either way, we can use hprobes to obtain these arguments. Essen-
tially, one needs to ensure that iov len will not cause overflow. Depending
on the environment, the operator can choose how to handle the detected
exploit. One could send an alert, simply modify iov len to a benign value
that causes vmsplice() to fail, or take a more drastic action (such as killing
the process or VM) if desired.
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The emergency detector works by checking the arguments of a system
call for a potential integer overflow. This differs in functionality from the
upstream patch,4 which checks if the memory region (specified by the struct
iovec argument) is accessible to the user program. One could write a probe
handler that performs a similar function by checking if all of the region
referred to by the struct iovec pointer + iov len is in the appropriate
range (e.g., by walking the page tables belonging to that process). However,
a temporary measure to protect against an attack should be as lightweight
and simple as possible to avoid unpredictable side effects. One major benefit
of using an hprobe handler is that developing this detector does not require
a deep understanding of the vulnerability: the developer of the emergency
detector only needs to understand that there is an integer overflow in an
argument. This is far simpler than developing and maintaining a patch for a
core kernel function (a system call), especially when reasoning about the risk
of running a home-patched kernel (a process that would void most enterprise
support agreements).
Our solution uses a monitoring system that resides outside of the VM
and relies on a hardware-enforced int3 event. A would-be attacker cannot
circumvent this event without having first compromised the hypervisor or
having modified the guest’s kernel code. This could be done with a code
injection attack that causes a different sys vmsplice() system call handler
to be invoked. However, it is unlikely that an attacker who already has the
privileges necessary for code injection into the kernel would have anything
to gain by exploiting a local privilege escalation vulnerability. While this
detector cannot defeat an attacker that has previously obtained root access,
its ease of rapid deployment sufficiently mitigates this risk. Since no reboot
is required and the detector can be used in a “read-only” monitoring mode
(only reporting the attack vs. taking an action), the risk of using this detector
on a running production system is minimal. To test the CVE-2008-0600
detector, we used a CENTOS5 VM (the exploit was discovered while the
source-equivalent Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.0 OS was in production) and
the publicly available exploit. As an unprivileged user, we ran an exploit
script on the unpatched OS and were able to obtain root access. With the
monitor in place, all attempts to obtain root access using the exploit code
4https://gitorious.org/kernel-linux/linux-stable/commit/
af395d8632d0524be27d8774a1607e68bdb4dd7f
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were detected.
5.4.2 Application Heartbeat Detector
One of the most basic reliability techniques used to monitor computing sys-
tem liveness is a heartbeat detector. In that class of detector, a periodic
signal is sent to an external monitor to indicate that the system is func-
tioning properly. A heartbeat serves as an illustrative example for how an
hprobe-based reliability detector can be implemented. Using hprobes, we
can construct a monitor that directly measures the application’s execution.
That is, since probes are triggered by application execution itself, they can
be viewed as a mechanism for direct validation that the application is func-
tioning correctly. Many applications execute a repetitive code block that is
periodically reentered (e.g., a Monte Carlo simulation that runs with a main
loop, or an http server that constantly listens for new connections). If one
profiles the application, it is possible to determine a period (in units of time
or using a counter like the number of instructions) at which this code block is
reentered. During correct operation of the application, one can expect that
the code block will be executed at the profiled interval.
The hprobe-based application heartbeat detector is built on the principle
described in the previous paragraph and illustrated in Fig 5.6. This test
detector is a kernel module that is installed in the Host OS (i.e., one of
the detectors on the left side of Fig. 5.2). An hprobe is inserted at the
start of the code block that is expected to be periodically reentered. When
the hprobe is inserted, a delayed workqueue5 is scheduled for the timeout
corresponding to the reentry period for the code block. When the timeout
expires, the workqueue function is executed and declares failure (if the user
desires a more aggressive watchdog style detector, it is possible to have the
hprobe handler perform an action such as restart the application or VM).
During correct operation (i.e., when the hprobe is hit), the workqueue is
canceled and a new workqueue is scheduled for the same interval, starting a
new timeout period. This continues until the application finishes or the user
no longer desires to monitor it and removes the hprobe. If having an hprobe
hit on every iteration of the main loop is too costly, one can ensure that the
5http://www.makelinux.net/ldd3/chp-7-sect-6
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probe active for an acceptable time interval and it can be added/removed
until desirable performance is achieved (the detection latency would still be
low as a tight loop would have a small timeout value).
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Figure 5.6: Application heartbeat detector. A probe is inserted in a critical
periodic section of the application (e.g., the main loop). During normal
execution, a timer is continuously reset. In the presence of a failure (such as
an I/O hang), the timer expires and failure is declared.
We use the open-source Path Integral Quantum Monte Carlo (pi-qmc)
simulator [69] as a test application.6 This application represents a long-
running scientific program that can take many hours or days to complete.
As is typical with scientific computing applications, pi-qmc has a large main
loop. Since Monte Carlo simulation involves repeated sampling and therefore
repeated execution of the same functions, we only need to run the main loop
a handful of times to determine the time per iteration. After determining the
expected duration of each iteration, we set the heartbeat to timeout to the
twice the expected value, set the detector to a statement at the end of the
main loop, and injected hangs (e.g., SIGSTOP) and crashed the application
(e.g., SIGKILL). All crashes (including VM crashes since the timer executes
in the hypervisor) were detected.
5.4.3 Infinite Loop Detector
Infinite loops are a common failure that can cause process hangs. When
considering proper execution of a loop in a program (that is not the main
loop), the number of instructions executed in a given block of code usually
falls into a fixed range, with the upper bound being the worst case execution
time (WCET) [20]. Determining the WCET is a well studied problem in
6Available at: http://phys-tools.github.com/pi-qmc/
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real-time systems, and solving it is beyond the scope of our work. Similarly,
if one can identify a block of code or function that is executed repeatedly,
the number of times that block is executed before the end is reached should
also fall into a fixed range. One can use an automated system to infer loop
invariants and bound the number of times the loop should execute [70].
Given a block of code and the WCET (either in units of time or the number
of executions of that block of code), one can build a detector using a pair of
hprobes. When one knows the wall clock time, one can insert one probe at
the inside the block and another probe after the block. At the first probe,
a timer is started (using the same technique as the heartbeat detector in
Section 5.4.2). If the timer expires before the second probe (at the end) is
reached, the detector reports a failure. If there is concern that the hypervisor
or guest OS is over-provisioned and significant time sharing is taking place,
one can use architectural invariants [28, 14] to only count the time when
the application under consideration is being executed by monitoring context
switch events using the CR3 register. For the case where a bound on the
number of executions of the block of code is known, one can place one probe
at the beginning of the loop and one immediately after the loop. If the
probe inside the loop is executed more times than expected without the block
being exited, then the detector can report failure (i.e., a range violation [71]).
Depending on the needs of the user, the detector can either reset its state or
remove itself when the exit probe is hit.
In addition to using the WCET, one can also observe the state of the
system to detect an infinite loop [72]. When using KVM, the register state
of the VM is saved in KVM data structures to be reloaded upon the next
VM entry. As mentioned in Section 5.3.3, probes inserted by a kernel module
in the host OS pass a structure describing the vCPU that generated the
int3 exception. This structure contains another structure with architecture
specific information, including the register state at the time of the VM Exit.
The detector can check this state at every loop iteration. If the registers
remain constant across a large number of iterations, this static state can be
attributed to an infinite loop in many applications.
In order to test the infinite loop detector, we used the same example as
presented in Jolt [72]. That example is a bug found in a development branch
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of the Exuberant Ctags source code indexer.7 In that bug, a string parsing
loop would get stuck due to two variable names being transposed in the source
code. The example input for the ctags indexer used in Jolt is the python
scientific computing package numpy.8 Specifically, the import tools.py file
contains comments that are formatted in such a way that the bug is activated.
In the fixed version of the code the loop executes only one iteration each of
the twelve times it is entered, meaning a small threshold could also be used.
Regardless of whether the threshold or register change method is used, this
loop was easily detected in all experiments since it executes at a rate of
thousands of times per second.
5.5 Performance
5.5.1 Methodology
All of our microbenchmarks and detector performance evaluations were con-
ducted on a Dell PowerEdge R720 server with dual-socket Intel Xeon E5-2660
“Sandy Bridge” 2.20GHz CPUs (3.0 GHz turbo boost). To obtain runtime
measurements, we have added an extra hypercall to KVM that starts and
stops a timer inside the host OS. This allows us to obtain measurements in-
dependent of VM clock jitter. To ensure consistency among measurements,
the test VMs were rebooted between each sample.
5.5.2 Microbenchmarks
We perform microbenchmarks that estimate the latency of a single hprobe,
which is the time from when the VM executes int3 until the VM is re-
sumed (Steps 1–3 in Fig. 5.3). We run these microbenchmarks without a
probe handler function to determine the lower bound of hprobe-based de-
tector overhead. Since the round-trip latency of an individual VM Exit on
Sandy Bridge CPUs has been estimated to take roughly 290 ns [73] and our
hypercall measurement scheme induces additional VM Exits, it would be dif-
ficult to accurately measure the individual probe latency. Instead, we obtain
7http://ctags.sourceforge.net/
8http://www.numpy.org
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a mean round-trip latency by repeatedly executing a probed function a large
number of times (one million) and dividing by the total time taken for those
executions. This helps remove jitter due to timer inaccuracies as well as
the actual latency of the hypercall measurement system itself. For the test
probe function we have added a no-op kernel module to the Guest OS that
creates a dummy noop device with an ioctl that calls a noop func() kernel
function that performs no useful work (return 0). First, we insert an hprobe
at the noop func()’s location. Our microbenchmarking application starts by
issuing a hypercall to start the timer and then an ioctl against the noop
device. When the noop module in the guest OS receives the ioctl, it calls
noop func() one million times. Afterwards, another hypercall is issued from
the benchmarking application to read the timer value.
For the microbenchmarking experiment, we used a 32bit Ubuntu 14.04
guest and measured 1000 samples. The mean latency (across samples) was
found to be 2.6 µs. In addition to the Sandy Bridge CPU, we have also
included data for an older generation 2.66GHz Xeon E5430 “Harpertown”
processor (running the same kernel, KVM version, and VM image), which
had a mean latency of 4.1 µs. The distribution of latencies for these experi-
ments is shown in Fig. 5.7. The remainder of benchmarks presented use the
Sandy Bridge E5-2660. The hprobe prototype requires multiple VM Exits
per probe hit. However, in many practical cases the flexibility of dynamic
monitoring and lower maintenance due to a simple implementation outweigh
this cost. This flexibility can increase performance in many practical cases
by allowing one to add and remove probes throughout the VM’s lifetime,
as will be demonstrated later. Furthermore, CPU manufacturers are con-
stantly working to reduce the impact of VM Exits, as Intel’s VT-x saw an
80% reduction in VM Exit latency over its first six years [73].
5.5.3 Detector performance
In addition to microbenchmarking individual probes, we measure the over-
head of the example hprobe-based detectors presented in Section 5.4. All
measurements in this section were obtained using the hypercall-based timer.
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Figure 5.7: Single probe latency (parentheses are the CPU’s release year).
The E5-2660’s larger range can be attributed to “Turbo Boost,” where the
clock scales from 2.2 to 3.0GHz. The shaded area is the quartile range (25th
percentile to 75th percentile), whiskers are minimum/maximum, center is
the mean, and notches in the middle are the 95% confidence interval of the
mean.
Emergency Exploit Detector
Our integer overflow detector that protects against the CVE-2008-0600 vmsplice()
vulnerability is extremely lightweight. Unless vmsplice() is used, the over-
head of the detector is zero since the probe will not be executed. The
vmsplice() system call is rare (at least in open source repositories that we
searched), so this zero overhead is overwhelmingly the common case. Keep-
ing in mind that security vulnerabilities are often found in “cold” regions
of code [74], we believe this low-overhead to extend beyond our simple ex-
ample. One application that does use vmsplice() is Checkpoint/Restart in
Userspace (CRIU).9 CRIU uses vmsplice() to capture the state of open file
descriptors referring to pipes. We used the Folding@Home molecular dynam-
ics simulator [75] and the pi-qmc Monte Carlo simulator from earlier as test
programs. We ran these applications in a 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04 VM. At each
sample, we allowed the application to warm up (load input data and start
the main simulation) and then checkpointed it. The timing hypercalls were
inserted into CRIU to measure how long it takes to dump the application.
9http://www.criu.org/
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Table 5.1: CVE-2008-0600 Detector w/CRIU
Application Runtime (s) 95% CI (s) overhead (%)
F@H Normal 0.221 0.00922 0
F@H w/Detector 0.228 0.0122 3.30
F@H w/Na¨ıve Detector 0.253 0.00851 14.4
pi-qmc Normal 0.137 0.00635 0
pi-qmc w/Detector 0.140 0.00736 1.73
pi-qmc w/Na¨ıve Detector 0.152 0.00513 11.1
This was repeated 100 times for each case with and without the detector
and the results are tabulated in Table 5.1. From the table, we can see that
there is a slight difference in the mean checkpoint time (roughly 3.3% for
F@H and 1.7% for pi-qmc) and that the variance in the experiment with the
detector active is higher for the Folding@Home case. When checkpointing
Folding@Home, sys vmsplice() was called 28 times, and 11 times for pi-qmc.
We can attribute this to negative cache effects of the context switch when
activating probes. We also measured another class of “Na¨ıve” detector that
probes the system call() function (the entry point for all system calls) dur-
ing the checkpoint as opposed to sys vmsplice(). In the case where we probe
on all system calls, we can see that there is a significant performance penalty
(and the number of probe invocations increases to ∼ 3000). We remind the
reader that the detector only probes sys vmsplice(), meaning the overhead
incurred is only when taking a checkpoint.
Application Heartbeat Detector
We use the pi-qmc simulator from Section 5.4.2 to measure the performance
overhead of the application watchdog detector. The pi-qmc simulator allows
configuration of its internal sampling and we utilize this feature to vary the
length of the main loop. In order to determine how the detector impacts
performance we measure the total runtime of each iteration of the main loop
when the probe is inserted and run the program for 15 minutes. The results
of our experiments are shown in Fig. 5.8.
From Fig. 5.8, we show that the detector does not affect performance
in a statistically significant way. This is due to the fact that pi-qmc, like
many scientific computing applications, does a large amount of work in each
iteration of its main loop. However, by setting the threshold of the detector
to a conservative value (like twice the mean runtime), one can achieve fault
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Figure 5.8: Benchmarking of the application watchdog detector. The
horizontal axis indicates the scaling of an internal loop in the target pi-qmc
program. The vertical axis shows a distribution of the completion time for
each iteration of the main loop. The boxplot characteristics are the same as
in Fig. 5.7.
detection in a far more acceptable timeframe than other methods like manual
inspection. Furthermore, this detector goes beyond checking if the process
is still running - it can detect any fault that causes a main loop iteration
to halt (disk I/O hang, network outage when using MPI, software bug that
does not lead to a crash, etc.).
Infinite Loop Detector
In order to measure the performance overhead of our infinite loop detector,
we use a patched version of the ctags application from Section 5.4.3. We ran
ctags on the complete numpy source tree 60 times and obtained the mean
completion time and 95% confidence interval. The results are tabulated in
Table 5.2. There are two implementations of the detector used in these exper-
iments, the “Na¨ıve” detector and the “Smart” detector. The Na¨ıve detector
is the same detector as presented in Section 5.4.3 and the Smart detector has
probes that dynamically add/remove themselves (i.e., the loop exit probe is
only added after the loop is entered). When starting the application, the
code segment containing the target function was paged out to disk (a clean
boot for each sample). The rows in Table 5.2 with “Page fix” refer to the
runs where we needed to use the EPT mechanism presented in Section 5.3.3.
We also forced the application to page in the target code block at startup,
represented by the “No Page Fix” samples. From Table 5.2 we can see that
the performance impact of our solution to deal with paged-out user space
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Table 5.2: Ctags on numpy source tree
Application Runtime (s) 95% CI (s) % overhead
Normal 1.13 0.0325 N/A
Na¨ıve ILD - Page Fix 1.26 0.0229 11.5
Na¨ıve ILD - No Page fix 1.26 0.0265 11.8
Smart ILD - Page Fix 1.14 0.0267 1.15
Smart ILD - No Page Fix 1.15 0.0215 1.9
application code is not statistically significant (compare the “Page Fix” rows
of the same detector to the “No page fix” rows). However, using dynamic
probes yields large performance gains. In the Na¨ıve approach, the overall
overhead is roughly 11.5% for this input data. With the Na¨ıve detector, the
first and second probes get executed 2585 and 54308, respectively. This is
due to the fact that in many cases, the loop is skipped over, but the instruc-
tion immediately after the loop (i.e., what the second probe replaces) always
gets executed. In the Smart approach, the first and second probe both get
executed 2585 times (in correct operation on this input data, the loop has
only one iteration), yielding a nominal difference between the Smart imple-
mentations and the base case without probes. If this loop had instead a high
number of internal iterations, then one could use a similar dynamic probe
approach, but retain the exit probe and remove the internal probe, adding it
periodically or using a timeout mechanism. Note that the capability behind
the “Smart” approach is unique to the dynamism in the hprobe framework.
5.6 Conclusions
The Hprobe framework is characterized by its simplicity, dynamism, and abil-
ity to perform application-level monitoring. Our prototype for this frame-
work uses hardware-assisted virtualization and satisfies protection require-
ments presented in the literature [13]. We find that compared to past work,
the simplicity with which detectors can be implemented and inserted/re-
moved at runtime allows us to quickly develop monitoring solutions. Based
on our experience, this framework is appropriate for use in real-world envi-
ronments. From our sample detectors, we see that the framework is suitable
for providing detection for bugs, random faults, and use as a stopgap measure
against vulnerabilities.
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CHAPTER 6
HSHIELD: MONITORING HYPERVISOR
INTEGRITY
This chapter introduces hShield, an architectural support for enforcing Control-
Flow Integrity (CFI) of hypervisors.
6.1 Introduction
HyperTap and Hprobes, introduced in the previous chapters, rely on the
trustworthy of the underlying hypervisor to deploy their monitoring mecha-
nisms. In this chapter, we validate this assumption and propose an approach
to tighten the security of hypervisors. Particularly, we investigate VM-escape
attacks, which are attacks that compromise hypervisor executions via the
VM-hypervisor interface provided by hardware-assisted virtualization (HAV)
(see Chapter 2 for a review of HAV). Based on the analysis of this threat
model, we introduce a new monitoring technique that detects VM-escape
attacks.
In a virtualized system, the hypervisor is a single-point-of-failure. It is
the centralized component that manages interactions between VMs and the
underlining physical resources, such as computing, networking, and storage.
Most components in hypervisor are granted high-privilege to permit access to
the shared resources. If one of those components is compromised, the entire
virtualized system, including physical resources and other co-located VMs,
is potentially compromised as well. When an attack works on one instance
of hypervisor, the attack might be extending to affect other instances, which
have the same version as the exploited hypervisor.
To detect VM-escape attacks, we introduce a monitoring framework called
hShield. The core of hShield is an efficient control-flow integrity (CFI) en-
forcement, which is specifically designed based on our analysis of HAV-based
hypervisors. In addition, our CFI method addresses two fundamental limi-
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tations of state-of-the-art CFI techniques [76, 77], namely imprecise control-
flow graph (CFG) construction and the overhead of runtime CFI enforcement.
The design of hShield aims to provide the following features to hypervisor
security monitoring:
Resistance to VM escape attacks that subvert the control-flow
of the hypervisor. Many of attacks in this class can be classified into a
zero-day attack – attackers exploit an undiscovered vulnerability in the im-
plementation of a hypervisor, which allows them to execute malicious codes
together with the normal execution of the hypervisor. hShield aims at de-
tecting this class of attacks when they are being executed without knowing
the vulnerability in advance.
Negligible performance penalty in attack-free executions. Simi-
lar to HyperTap and Hprobes, hShield employs the principle of event-driven
monitoring, which is effective in detecting both transient and persistent at-
tacks. Additionally, we analyzed the hypervisor execution model to extract
events that hShield can efficiently monitor without incurring noticeable per-
formance overhead when the system is in an attack-free state.
In order to evaluate hShield, we compared the result of our CFI technique
with that of BinCFI [77], a state-of-the-art CFI implementation. Our exper-
iments show that the CFG constructed using our method is more precise,
thus, more secure in terms of CFI enforcement. More specifically, we showed
that the approximation of BinCFI’s static analysis leave dangerous paths in
CFGs that can be exploited by attacks to perform a VM-escape. In addition,
we showed that hShield can detect a real VM-escape attack that we crafted
from a published vulnerability.
6.2 Assumptions and Threat Model
6.2.1 Assumptions
Our design targets at hypervisors that utilize hardware virtualization (e.g.,
Intel VT-x and AMD SVM) to manage VMs’ executions. We make the
following assumptions about the system.
The underlining hardware virtualization is implemented correctly, meaning
that the only way to change from the VM privilege into the hypervisor priv-
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Figure 6.1: hShield protects hypervisor during execution. It assumes the
integrity of the platform is guaranteed at load-time by a Trusted Platform,
such as TPM or Intel TXT.
ilege is to going through the VM-exit interface, as described in Section 2.2.
We do not handle attacks that exploit hardware vulnerabilities.
The target host system is secured from physical tampering (e.g., secured in
a server room) and there is no insider-attacker (e.g., malicious administrators
who already have remote access to the host system).
The host system itself has limited direct open access from the outside world.
Preventing misuse of administrative credentials, e.g., through social engineer-
ing methods to illegally obtain an administrative credential and use it against
the host system, is out of the scope of this work.
The target host system is equipped with a trusted boot technology, such as
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [78], or Intel Trusted eXecution Technol-
ogy (TXT) [79], which ensures the integrity of the host system, including
the hypervisor, at load-time. Note that we focus on ensuring the integrity
of the hypervisor at runtime, given the integrity at load-time is guaranteed.
Figure 6.1 shows how hShield works in tandem with trusted platform tech-
nologies.
6.2.2 Threat Model
Virtualization creates an isolated environment for each VM, so that multiple
VMs can share common physical resources. The isolation is enforced so that
a VM cannot access resources of host system, or other co-located VMs.
The primary threat model that we consider is classified as VM escape
attacks. A VM escape attack is an attack that breaks the isolation wall
created by hypervisor to allow programs running inside a VM to violate
the integrity (i.e., alter the execution) of the hypervisor. In particular, an
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of a VM escape attack in a hardware
virtualization-based hypervisor. The attack entry point is the interface the
hypervisor created to handle VM-exit events. The attack diverts the
execution of the hypervisor (represented by the red box) from the normal
execution.
Table 6.1: Examples of high-profile VM escape-enabled CVEs from
2007-2015
CVEs Affected Hypervisors Description
CVE-2007-1744 VMware Workstation Directory traversal vulnerability in Shared Folders feature
CVE-2008-0923 VMWare ACE, Player,
and Workstation
Path traversal vulnerability in VMwares shared folders im-
plementation
CVE-2009-1244 VMware Workstation,
Player, ACE, Server,
Fusion, and ESX
Cloudburst - virtual video adapter vulnerability
CVE-2012-0217 Xen para-
virtualization (PV)
64-bit
Vulnerability in system calls returning via sysret to a non-
canonical RIP64-bit
CVE-2014-0983 Oracle VirtualBox 3D acceleration multiple memory corruption vulnerabili-
ties
CVE-2015-(2336-
2340)
VMare Workstation Escaping VMware Workstation through COM1 (5 CVEs)
CVE-2015-3456 QEMU, KVM, XEN QEMU heap overflow flaw in floppy disk driver
CVE-2015-5154 QEMU, KVM, XEN QEMU heap overflow flaw while processing certain ATAPI
commands
attacker originally has full control over a VM. During the execution of the
VM, the attacker is able to exploit unknown or unpatched vulnerabilities
of the hypervisor software in attempt to compromise the hypervisor. The
exploit allows the attacker to redirect control flow to execute malicious code.
The malicious code can be either injected by the attacker or salvaged from
existing code, e.g., through a return-oriented attack. The malicious code
is executed at the privilege of the hypervisor, thus it has permissions to
interfere and/or access secrets stored in the hypervisor and other co-located
VMs. This is a powerful class of attack. Figure 6.2 demonstrates the VM
escape attack via VM-exit interface.
Table 6.1 shows examples of VM escape-enabled vulnerability published in
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the CVE (Common Vulnerability Enumeration) database. These vulnerabil-
ities share a common feature is that they allow exploit code running inside
a VM to compromise the control follow integrity (CFI) of the underlining
hypervisor.
The assumption about attackers having full control over a VM is based
on practical settings of virtualized computing platforms. In a public IaaS
environment, such as Amazon AWS EC2, Microsoft Azure, or IBM Smart-
Cloud, users can create a VM to run custom software with very small cost.
In other virtualized environments, in which users have no direct access to a
VM, attackers may gain access to a VM through exploiting vulnerabilities in
the VM’s software (e.g., database or web service). Once having full control
over a VM, an attacker can use the VM as an entry point to start attacking
the underlining hypervisor.
We further break down VM escape attacks into transient attacks and per-
manent attacks. Transient attacks are attacks that occur stealthily fast in
order to bypass periodic integrity measurements [80]. Meanwhile, permanent
attacks once performed stay persistently in the target system. Majority of in-
tegrity measurement techniques are designed to cope with persistent attacks,
leaving a gap for transient attacks to exploit [80]. Previous work [14, 15] has
demonstrated the high effectiveness of transient attacks against periodic, or
polling-based, monitoring. Our threat model includes both transient and
permanent VM escape attacks.
6.3 hShield Approach Overview
This section describes the approach of our system, called hShield, to achieve
the goals established in the previous section.
6.3.1 Limitations of Existing Control Flow Integrity
Monitoring
CFI enforcement [76] is a common method used to prevent attacks relying on
subverting executions of target systems (e.g., via exploiting buffer overflow
vulnerabilities). In this method, valid execution paths of a program are
represented as a Control-Flow Graph (CFG). The CFI runtime enforcement
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Figure 6.3: Example of a control flow graph (CFG). The nodes in the graph
are basic blocks. The edges are flow control transfers from one basic block
to another. The flow control transfer from node 2 to nodes 3 and 4 are
indirect flow transfer, because the target of the call instruction is
determined by the value of the register eax at runtime.
ensures that the target program must execute follow a valid path in a pre-
determined CFG.
A CFG is a directed graph, in which a node represents a basic block1 in the
program, and a directed edge represents a transfer in the control-flow (e.g.,
a jump, call, or return instruction) from a source node, where the transfer
is invoked, to the target node, where the transfer lands at. Figure 6.3 is an
example of a CFG.
Runtime enforcing CFI aims at protecting target programs against un-
known attacks based on the validity of CFG. A pre-determined CFG is es-
sentially a whitelist of valid execution paths that are allowed to be executed.
Hence, this whitelist-based monitoring approach can detect attacks that di-
vert the target program to execute an invalid path according to the deter-
mined CFG, as opposed to a black-list-based monitoring approach which can
only detect previously identified attacks.
The first challenge of CFI enforcement is to obtain a precise CFG of the
target program. The existing approach to CFG construction is to use static
analysis [76, 77] – analyzing the source code or binary of target programs.
However, static analysis cannot determine indirect control flow transfer – the
control-flow targets that are computed at runtime, e.g., function pointers or
return addresses. In order to address this limitation, current CFI techniques
employ approximation to statically determine such dynamic targets [77].
This imprecision is a potential source for attack to bypass CFI security run-
1A basic block is a consecutive sequence of instructions with no jump target except the
entry and no jump source except the exit
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time enforcement. For example, an attack can use a jump-to-libc attack to
invoke functions that dynamically-incorrect, but statically-approximated.
The second challenge of CFI enforcement is to minimize the runtime over-
head caused by runtime validation. The approach used by state-of-the-art
CFI techniques is to perform target validation, e.g., validate whether the cur-
rent jump follows a valid edge in the CFG, at the end of every basic block.
The main challenge of this approach is to keep the performance overhead of
the validation small due to the high frequency of basic block jumps.
6.3.2 hShield CFG Construction
hShield addresses the approximated CFG issue mentioned above by combin-
ing static analysis and profiling to construct a CFG. More specifically, we
use static analysis to construct an initial CFG, which contains basic blocks
(nodes in the CFG) and direct jumps (edges in the CFG), extracted from
the target program binary. To derive indirect control flow information, we
analyze the profiled traces of the target program execution under a set of
representative workloads.
A trace records sequences of basic blocks visited during the execution of
the target program. The order of basic blocks in a trace can be used to
construct a CFG. For instance, two consecutive basic blocks B1 and B2 in a
trace indicate that there is an edge from node B1 to node B2 in the CFG. A
CFG constructed based on profiled traces contains both direct and indirect
control flow information. However, the constructed CFG may not cover all
possible valid paths that the target program may execute. The path coverage
of the CFG is determined by the workloads used to execute and record the
traces of the target program. All the collected traces are used to construct a
CFG.
The initial CFG constructed using static analysis is merged with the CFG
constructed based on profiled execution traces to produce a single CFG.
That CFG contains both direct and indirect control flow information. This
approach combines the advantages of both methods: static analysis can ex-
tract direct control flows, and execution traces contain indirect control flows
which can only be accurately determined at runtime.
For the purpose of detecting VM escape attacks, the constructed CFG of
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Figure 6.4: The distribution of VM Exit reasons profiled during the
execution of a VM under CentOS Linux booting and UnixBench workloads.
a hypervisor needs to cover all valid execution paths from a VM Exit to
the corresponding VM Entry. According to our threat model, this is the
only attack vector that an attacker inside a VM can use to penetrate the
hypervisor.
Figure 6.4 and 6.5 show the result of the CFG construction for the KVM-
QEMU hypervisor. Figure 6.4 indicates that IO INSTRUCTIONs are the most
frequent type of VM Exits: 82% of VM Exits triggered during the execution
of a VM under CentOS booting and the set of utilities in the UnixBench
benchmark are IO-related events.
Figure 6.5 shows the detailed CFG construction results for QEMU using
various types of workloads. In a KVM-QEMU hypervisor, all IO-related
VM Exits are handled by QEMU; thus, the collected events presented in
the graph are IO-related events. The CFG was incrementally constructed
using the traces collected by executing the workloads in order listed in the
x-axis. Each of the workloads was run three times. The graph shows that
neither new nodes nor edges were discovered after the PostMark benchmark,
meaning that the CFG constructed by a subset of benchmarks is able to
cover all paths to execute all the selected benchmarks.
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Figure 6.6: HashSet construction.
6.3.3 hShield Runtime Enforcement
hShield proposes a novel technique to improve the performance overhead
of CFI runtime enforcement. This technique is particularly designed for
HAV-based hypervisor execution model. Existing CFI enforcement performs
validation at every control flow transfer. This validation is the major source
of performance degradation incurring while executing protected programs.
hShield’s solution to this issue is to reduce the validation frequency by de-
laying it until a VM Entry is about to execute. Per our measurement, on
average the frequency of executing a VM Entry is three orders of magnitude
smaller than the frequency of a control flow transfer in the KVM-QEMU
hypervisor.
hShield implements a hardware counter to compute a hashed value of hy-
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pervisor execution on-the-fly. Figure 6.6 describes how a hash is computed for
each VM Exit handling. At the end of a VM Exit handling, triggered by a VM
Entry event, hShield compares the computed hash against a pre-constructed
HashSet. The pre-constructed HashSet represents the constructed CFG of
the hypervisor. In other words, the HashSet is a whitelist of valid hypervisor
execution paths. If an execution path is not listed in this whitelist, hShield
flags it as an offended execution.
This approach of delaying CFI validation to the end of each VM Exit han-
dling makes an important trade-off comparing the existing CFI enforcement:
reducing performance overhead with the cost of longer detection latency.
Since current techniques check for CFI at every control flow transfer, a CFI
violation can be detected right before the execution of a malicious code. In
hShield, the detection happens at the end of the violated VM Exit handling.
Section 6.4 details the hash function that hShield uses, and section 6.5
describes the architectural support to hShield.
6.4 Execution Hashing
The function of execution hashing is to map an arbitrarily long execution
pattern input to a fixed length output hash value. An execution pattern is a
stream of machine instructions executed by the processor.
6.4.1 Requirements
The hash function needs to be collision resistant. The this property is to
ensure that it is computationally unfeasible to find a collision – an outside
execution pattern that has the same hash as one of the white-listing members.
Most standard cryptographic functions, such as MD5 or the SHA family, have
this property.
The hardware implementation poses several extra constraints. First, the
function needs to be interactive; that, is a hash can be continuously evaluated
at runtime as input instructions coming, instead of storing the whole history
of instructions and perform calculation at the end.
In addition, the hash function needs to facilitate the implementation of
loop rerolling. hShield’s loop rerolling involves frequent comparisons of ba-
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sic blocks. Thus, hashing individual basic blocks should be an intermediate
operation of the entire hashing scheme. Furthermore, loop rerolling requires
re-evaluation of the final hashing output at runtime. For example, the hash-
ing output changes when a loop iteration is removed. The ability to efficiently
re-evaluate outputs at runtime is a necessity to enable hShield to cope with
various issues, such as ones caused by hardware speculative executions. With
speculative execution, a conditional branch may be predictively evaluated in
advance, and unrolled and re-executed if the prediction was wrong.
6.4.2 Incremental collision-free hashing
The hashing function we select is a variation of the MuHASH function in
the family of incremental collision-free hashing functions proposed in [81].
The key property which makes this family of hashing function suitable to
our usage is that it is incremental. This property allows a hash value to
be updated when a portion of the input is changed without caching or re-
computing the value from scratch. We leverage this feature to facilitate loop
rerolling implementation and cope with speculative execution.
This family of hashing function splits hashing into two phases: randomize
and combine. Each input is broken into a sequence of blocks, and each block
is randomized independently using a standard hashing function (e.g., a SHA
function). The output of randomization is combined using an inexpensive
commutative operation, e.g., modular multiplication in the case of MuHASH.
Thanks to the communicative property of the combining operation, a hashed
value can be updated by re-evaluating the randomized value of the modified
input block.
Besides incrementality, MuHASH offers other properties that is suitable to
hShield requirements:
• Collision-resistance: Based on an assumed-perfect standard hashing
function (e.g., a SHA function), the security strength – the hardness of
finding a collision – of the MuHASH is proven to be equivalent to the
hardness of the discrete logarithm problem [81].
• Parallel construction: The randomization phase can be performed in
parallel for each block. Note that property is stronger than interactive
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construction. We leverage this property to perform randomization per
basic block with a small memory footprint.
• Efficiency : The construction uses only standard hashing function and
inexpensive modular operation (as opposed to using exponentiation).
The efficiency of this hashing function family is the same as using a
standard hashing function on the entire input [81].
6.4.3 Runtime Construction
Essentially, the counter operates as a hash function f :
f : Exe× Salts→ Range.
The hash function f maps from the space of finite variable-length instruc-
tion streams Exe and a space of salt values Salts to the space of fixed length
output value Range.
An execution E ∈ Exe is a finite length stream of basic block B1B2...Bn,
each basic block is a sequence of instructions I1I2..Im. Each instruction Ii is
a valid x86 instruction represented in its binary form.
A salt salt ∈ Salts is a unique value for each system, thus it individualizes
each system’s counter table. A salt value is generated for a counter table
when the profiling mode is executed. Note that for a salt to be effective, it
does not need to be random. Thanks to the uniqueness property of salts, the
work of crafting exploit code must be redone for each every system.
A hashing session starts on a VM-exit event, and ends on the corresponding
VM-entry event. The continuous construction of the hash function during a
session is as follows:
• Step 1: Session starts with resetting basic block counter to i = 1
• Step 2: For each incoming basic block Bi, concatenate a 32-bit bi-
nary encoding 〈i〉 of the basic block counter, and the salt value: B′i =
〈i〉.〈salt〉.Bi
• Step 3: (Randomization) Compute a hash value for the incoming basic
block: hi = sha1(B
′
i)
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• Step 4: (Combination) Combine hi using a combining operation  to
get the current hash value of the execution chunk:
fi =
h1, i = 1fi−1  hi, i > 1
As recommended by [81], we use the arithmetic operation multiplica-
tion modulo for combining operator to achieve collision-resistance.
• Step 5: Continue go back to step 2 until the session is ended.
Assuming that there are n basic blocks in the evaluated execution chunk E,
the final construction can be summarized in Figure 6.7, and as the equation
follows:
f(E, salt) = ni=1sha1(〈i〉.〈salt〉.Bi)
<1>.<s>.B1! <n>.<s>.Bn!<2>.<s>.B2!
B’1! B’2! B’n!
combine operation
Execution E
…!
…!
sha1(B’1)! …!sha1(B’2)! sha1(B’n)!
⨷!
f(E, s)
Figure 6.7: The construction of the incremental hashing function.
6.5 hShield Architectural Design
hShield is a security assisted hardware extension to the existing HAV to per-
form whitelist-based continuous monitoring of hypervisor executions. This
section describes an example architectural design of hShield.
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6.5.1 hShield Components
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Figure 6.8: hShield architecture. Each CPU core has its own hShield
counter to measure hypervisor execution at runtime. After a measurement
is complete, the result is sent to the hShield core, which is a dedicated core
per host system, to verify the measurement.
Each physical host is equipped with one hShield unit. An hShield unit con-
sists of multiple per-core hShield Counters and one per-host hShield Auditor.
Each hShield counter is built into a processor core, called the counter’s host
core. Each counter independently carries out the measurement of VM-exit
handler executing on its host core. At the end of each measurement, the
result, i.e., the hash represents the VM-exit handler execution, is sent to the
auditor for whitelist member checking. The hShield auditor, implemented
as a dedicated co-processor in this design, is responsible for securely loading
and storing the whitelist, and efficiently executing whitelist updating and
membership checking. Figure 6.8 illustrates this architecture.
hShield is designed to facilitate both whitelist construction and runtime
checking. hShield auditor has two operational modes: profiling and checking.
The profiling mode is used to support whitelist construction. In this mode,
the auditor records hashes sent by counters to its hash tables. Meanwhile,
the checking mode is used to validate hypervisor’s executions during regular
runs (e.g., with arbitrary clients’ VMs). In this mode, the auditor validates
an execution by comparing the hash sent by a counter against in the whitelist
loaded in its hash tables.
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hShield architectural design follows the separation of concerns principle.
After being initialized by the centralized auditor, the operations of each
counter are independent from each other, and also independent from the
auditor. An hShield counter operates the same way whether the auditor is in
the profiling or checking mode. The only component that stores the whitelist
is the auditor. During runtime, there is only one type of unidirectional inter-
action between a counter and the auditor, which is sending-receiving a hash.
There is no other interface that can leak information about the whitelist from
the auditor to any of the processing cores.
Table 6.2 shows the interface of hShield Counters and hShield Auditor via
the commands they process. The next subsections describe in details hShield
counters and auditors.
Table 6.2: hShield Counter and Auditor commands
Command Callee∗ Caller Mode+ Parameters Return
HS COUNTER INIT Counter Auditor () void
HS WL COUNT Auditor Software Profiling () Number of members
HS WL READ Auditor Software Profiling (s, e) Whitelist members in-
dexed from s to e
HS SALT READ Auditor Software Profiling () salt
HS HASH Auditor Counter Profiling/
Checking
hash void
∗ Callee is the either a Counter or Auditor, which processes the commands.
 Caller is the component that can invoke the command. When a caller is “Software”, that means this
command is an instruction available for a software to use.
+ Mode is applicable for Auditor (as a callee) only. Mode specifies in which Auditor’s mode (“Profiling”,
“Checking”, or both) the command is available.
6.5.2 hShield Counters
Figure 6.9 depicts the finite state machine (FSM) of an hShield counter’s
operation. Each node of the FSM represents an operational state of a counter,
and each edge represents an event that triggers a state transition. Note that
the FSM can be terminated when it is in any state, and the “End” state is
not shown in the figure for readability purposes. Besides the “End” state,
an hShield counter can be in one of the following operational states:
“Init”: At boot time, all hShield counters are initialized by the hShield
auditor. Particularly, the hShield auditor instructs each of the hShield coun-
ters to load two common salt and proof values. When the initialization
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Figure 6.9: Finite state machine of an hShield counter operation. A node is
a state of the counter, an edge is an event that triggers a state transition.
All state can transit to the “End” state, which is not shown in this figure.
is done, represented by the “Done initialization” edge, the hShield counter
transits to the “Ready” state.
“Ready”: When an hShield counter is in this state, the processor is ex-
ecuting either in the guest mode (i.e., a VM is executing), or other tasks
that do not belong to the hypervisor. Upon a “VM-exit” event, the counter
transits to the “Reset counter” state. Meanwhile, upon an event that indi-
cates “Hypervisor resumed” (e.g., a task switch event that the to-be-executed
task belongs to the hypervisor), the counter transits to the “Reload counter”
state.
“Reset counter”: An hShield counter in this state is to respond to a
VM-exit event issued by its host core. In this state, the counter resets all its
internal state, e.g., the basic block counter, to get ready for a new hashing
session. Upon completing the resetting, the counter transits to the “Count”
state.
“Reload counter”: In this state, the hShield counter loads an on-going
hashing session context from memory to its internal state. The counter only
loads the context which was properly signed using its hShield Proof. Upon
completing the loading, the counter transits to the “Counter” state.
“Count”: When an hShield counter is in this state, the host core is exe-
cuting a hypervisor task that handles a VM-exit. In this state, the counter
executes a hashing session, which implements the execution inference tech-
niques and incremental hashing scheme (detailed in Section 6.4). In the event
of a task switching, the counter suspends the on-going hashing session, and
then moves to the “Save counter” state. In the event of an VM-entry,
which signifies the end of the on-going hashing session, the counter computes
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the final hash of the hypervisor execution, and then transits to the “Send
Hash” state.
“Save counter”: In this state, the hShield counters save the context of
the on-going hashing session to main memory. The saved data is signed with
the hShield Proof to prevent tampering. Upon completing the saving, the
counter transits back to the “Ready” state.
“Send Hash”: This state marks the end of a hashing session by sending
its result to the hShield auditor. Upon completing the sending, the counter
transits back to the “Ready” state.
The next subsections discuss some issues in implementing hShield coun-
ters. Since an implementation of hShield is platform-dependent, we often
concertize our discussion by using examples from Intel VT-x in the x86 ar-
chitecture.
HAV Integration
The implementation of hShield counters requires the ability to intercept VM-
exit and VM-entry events. In Intel VT-x, in response to a VM-exit, the
processor performs a sequence of operations to save guest state and then
load host state. To incorporate an hShield counter, one would need to add
the operation of the state “Reset counter” to the end of existing sequence of
operations. Similarly, in response to a VM-entry (e.g., triggered by either of
the instructions VMLAUNCH or VMRESUME in Intel VT-x), we would need to add
the operation of the state “Send Hash” to the beginning of the VM-entry
operations.
Handling Interrupts
hShield counters exclude the executions of interrupt and exception handlers
in the construction of execution hashes. In order to do so, we can leverage
the existing hardware interrupt signal handling mechanism. When a proces-
sor detects the occurrence of an interrupt signal, it suspends the currently
running task, saves the task context, and then starts executing the interrupt
handler specified in the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT). When the inter-
rupt handler is complete (e.g., upon an invocation of an IRET instruction),
the processor resumes the execution of the suspended task to ensure program
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Table 6.3: Content of an hShield Counter session context
Field Size Notes
Current SHA1 hash 20B State to resume SHA1 computation
Instruction cache 64B of the current basic block
Basic block counter 8B Number of basic blocks
Current MuHash hash 20B Intermediate result of MuHash
Checksum∗ 20B Checksum of the context signed by hShield Proof
Total size 132B
∗ Checksum is not a field in a session context, it is computed and saved together with a session context
in memory.
continuity. Similarly, hShield pauses its on-going hashing session when an
interrupt occurs, and then resumes the session when the interrupt handler is
complete.
Handling Task Switching
On a physical core, a running VM-exit handling task, the subject of hShield
counter measurement, can be scheduled out to yield CPU to other tasks.
Therefore, the context of the on-going hashing session associated with the
hypervisor task needs to be saved together with the context of the hypervisor
task, so that the hashing session can be resumed when the hypervisor task
is resumed. This situation is handled by the “Save counter” state.
The context of an hShield counter to be saved is described in Table 6.3. A
checksum of the session content signed by the hShield Proof is stored together
with the session content. This checksum is used by hShield counter when
resuming the hashing session to verify the integrity of the session context.
This mechanism is to defeat false key injection attacks while a session context
is stored in memory.
Handling Multi-cores
HAV uses the notion of virtual CPU (VCPU) cores to indicate a VM’s CPU
core. Each physical CPU core can handle one VCPU core at the same time,
similar to tasks. And VM-exits are generated and handled independently on
each physical CPU core. Therefore, each physical core needs to maintain an
independent hashing session, which can run in parallel with other hashing
sessions happening on other physical cores.
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In order to handle concurrent hashing sessions, we tailor an hShield counter
to each CPU core. This approach is similar to that of existing performance
counters. When a VM-exit is trapped in a physical core, the hashing session
on that core is started to measure the execution of the VM-exit handler
running on that core.
6.5.3 hShield Auditor
An hShield Auditor is a centralized component that manages the whitelist
for a host system. An hShield Auditor operates in either of the two modes:
profiling and checking. Setting which mode hShield Auditor operates on is
done through the BIOS.
Profiling Mode
The profiling mode is used to facilitate the construction of the target hy-
pervisor whitelist. This mode is also considered the unsafe mode of hShield
Auditor, because its whitelist can be read and updated. Thus, the profiling
mode must be ran in a strictly controlled environment with known-good VM
workloads. In this mode, an hShield Auditor performs the following tasks:
At boot time, the following tasks are performed in a sequence:
1. Generates a new salt value.
2. Generates a new proof value.
3. Broadcasts the HS COUNTER INIT command together with the salt and
proof values to all hShield Counters in the host to trigger their initial-
ization process.
During runtime, the following tasks are performed in response to specific
events:
• Upon receiving a hash from a Counter, the Auditor updates its hashing
tables. The updating process is described in Section 6.5.3.
• Upon receiving a HS WL COUNT instruction, the Auditor returns the num-
ber of whitelist members.
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• Upon receiving a HS WL READ instruction, the Auditor returns the hash
corresponding to the specified whitelist member.
• Upon receiving a HS SALT READ instruction, the Auditor returns the
value of the generated salt.
The HS WL READ and HS SALT READ instructions are used at the end of the
profiling process to fetch the whitelist from the hShield Auditor to persist to
the host’s storage.
Checking Mode
The checking mode is used for runtime monitoring of the target hypervisor,
given that the whitelist has been properly constructed. In this mode, an
hShield Auditor performs the following tasks:
At boot time, after the integrity of the host system is verified, e.g., by
TPM and Intel TXT, the following task are performed in a sequence:
1. Load the whitelist and salt from the host persistent storage.
2. Generates a new proof value.
3. Broadcasts the HS COUNTER INIT command together with the salt and
proof values to all hShield Counters in the host to trigger their initial-
ization process.
During runtime:
• Upon receiving a hash from a Counter, the Auditor verify the member-
ship of the hash.
Regardless of the hShield Auditor’s operational mode, the operation of the
hShield Counters in the same host is not affected: upon each VM-entry, the
corresponding hShield Counter send a hash to the centralized Auditor.
Hash Tables
Hash tables are hShield Counters internal storage to keep the whitelist. An
hShield Counter contains two hash tables: hot and warm. The two tables
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function in the same way, except the following differences: The hot table’s
size is smaller than the warm table’s; the hot table stores the top popular
whitelist members, while the warm table stores the less popular whitelist
members; a membership check operation is performed in the hot table first,
and if there is no hit in the hot table, the operation is then performed in the
warm table.
The hot-warm hash table design is to take advantage of the observed dis-
tribution of the frequency of the hit rate of whitelist members. The hot table
is smaller, but stores the most frequently hit whitelist members.
6.6 Evaluation
6.6.1 CFG Constructed by Dynamic Profiling
To understand the feasibility of constructing the whitelist, some sample data
was collected using the x86 performance counters [82]. The data was col-
lected using a CentOS 7 virtual machine with 512 MB of RAM. The work-
loads used to collect data included the iozone file-system benchmark and
the ApacheBench server performance measuring tool. The hardware perfor-
mance counters instrumented were the total instructions retired and the total
number of branch instructions.
These workloads generated two sets of data, one for QEMU and one for
KVM. The data is in the form of a vector counters combined with a single exit
reason, which describes the context of the measurement collection. In the
QEMU data set, exit reasons observed were limited to memory mapped and
traditional input/output. This is likely because an exit into QEMU mostly
occurs to access hardware-related features (because QEMU is a machine em-
ulator). The KVM data set contains a large number of exit reasons, which
allow for more detailed analysis of the underlying workload. The reason for
the higher level of detail in KVM’s exit reasons is that QEMU must trap
to KVM for each privileged instruction, and this occurs in a wide range of
scenarios.
Examining a graph of new signatures over time allows us to observe new
workloads visually. A new workload (or one that is malicious) will cause the
graph to slope upwards. We expect to see a flat trend for workloads that have
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already been added to the whitelist. Breaking down these graphs by indi-
vidual exit type also helps expose certain relationships and properties about
workloads. We also expect to see a large number of repeated signatures in
the data which will assist in keeping the whitelist memory usage reasonable.
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Figure 6.10: The number of unique IO exits observed over time from the
KVM portion of the data. The vertical lines, from left to right, represent
when the shell is first displayed, the beginning of the first iozone run, the
end of the first run (and beginning of the second), the end of the second
run (and beginning of the third), and the end of the third run as the end of
the graph.
We designed a simple experiment to test this hypothesis. To collect data,
the iozone filesystem benchmark was installed on the VM. The VM was then
started and iozone was run three consecutive times. The data was then
grouped into buckets. A bucket is defined as a range of values of a given
size. For example, if the bucket size is 10, the first bucket contains all values
0-9, the second contains 10-19, etc. The bucket size can be tweaked to reveal
different insights about the data. Figure 6.10 shows the results of graphing
this data. The graph shows that during an iozone run, there are new values
observed outside of this threshold. This shows the feasibility of hShield’s
ability to detect new workloads.
The data collected shows some other interesting properties. Only 337621
(37.51%) of the 900000 signatures collected were unique (this value was ob-
tained without using any grouping by bucket). Assuming that we use a
20-byte cryptographic hashing function to represent an execution path, we
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would need about 6.4 Mbyte of storage to construct the whitelist. We also
observed that the popularity of execution paths follows the zip distribution.
We can leverage this property to further partition the set of execution paths
according to the measured popularity to favor the lookup time for more fre-
quently used execution paths.
6.6.2 Detection of Real Attacks
In this section, we describe a VM-escape attack that we implemented based
on the QEMU’s Vemon vulnerability discovered in May 2015 [21]. Venom
is a buffer-overflow vulnerability in the implementation of the QEMU floppy
disk driver’s buffer. This vulnerability allows any guest VM to overwrite the
heap memory of the host QEMU process by executing an io out instruction.
VM#Exit#
VM#Entry
ioctl()io(port 0x35,command 0x8e)
fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos++] = value;
QEMUBHFunc *bh->cb
shellcodecallq bh->cb
overwrite
point*to
Virtual(Machine KVM/XEN QEMU((version*contains Venom*vulnerability)
Figure 6.11: Exploit Venom vulnerability for a VM escape attack.
By examining the QEMU’s heap memory layout, we discover that one can
use this vulnerability to overwrite a function pointer stored in the heap to
redirect QEMU to execute a function of their choice. More specifically, the
exploitable function pointer is in the QEMUBHFunc structure, which determines
how to handle a bottom-half (BH) routine of an interrupt. Moreover, this
function pointer allows the caller to pass an arbitrary parameter to the target
function. This parameter is also stored in the QEMUBHFunc, which can be
controlled by the attacker. Our exploit code is able to overwrite the content
of this function pointer as well as the to-be-passed parameter to direct QEMU
to execute the system() function – a libc function that runs a given shell
command. The shell command could be any command, such as starting a
backdoor program, or disable system firewall, as long as the QEMU process
has permission to run. Figure 6.11 illustrates is exploit in a KVM-QEMU
hypervisor setup.
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In our experiment, hShield was able to identify that the execution of the
hypervisor to handle the VM-exit initiated by the exploited io out instruc-
tion from the malicious VM. Our experiment covered two scenarios. The
first scenario tested the detection using a CFG constructed without using a
floppy disk workload. Thus, all execution paths of QEMU that go to the
floppy driver are invalid according to this CFG. The second scenario tested
the detection using a CFG constructed by using a floppy disk workload. The
detection is raised when the function pointer in the QEMUBHFunc is invoked,
because in our CFG, the system() in libc is not a valid target of the call site
of this invocation.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents hShield together with a new CFI enforcement method,
both of which are specifically designed to detect VM-escape attacks. We have
shown the advantages of our proposed CFI enforcement method, e.g., more
precise CFG and lower computational overhead for runtime CFI enforcement,
over state-of-the-art CFI enforcement techniques. Our hShield system is
able to detect hand-crafted VM-escape attacks that are based on published
vulnerabilities.
hShield is the lowest-level system in our monitoring series, including Hprobes,
HyperTap, and hShield. The three monitoring systems create a complete
bottom-top chain-of-trust for the entire virtualization software stack.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This thesis describes three contributions of our research toward achieving
resiliency for virtualized computer systems. We took a multi-layered mon-
itoring approach, in which we built specific systems that provide monitor-
ing capability at specific layers of the virtualization software stack, namely,
HyperTap to protect guest OS, Hprobes to protect guest applications, and
hShield to protect the hypervisor.
First, we present HyperTap, an out-of-VM monitoring framework that
leverages existing VM-exit mechanism of HAV to provide low-cost event-
driven monitoring. In HyperTap, we define a rich set of rules that can be
used to robustly derive information about guest OS activities from hardware
state. We then demonstrate use cases in which this information is used to
build reliability and security detectors that cannot be bypassed.
Next, we describe another out-of-VM monitoring framework, called Hprobes,
which focus on providing dynamic monitoring placement. Hprobes addresses
the main limitation of HyperTap, which is the inflexibility in adding and re-
moving monitoring hooks at runtime. In addition, Hprobes’s dynamic hook
placement mechanism facilitates the construction of out-of-VM guest appli-
cations monitoring. HyperTap and Hprobes can work in tandem to provide
a complete monitoring coverage to both guest OS and applications.
Finally, we introduce hShield to continuously monitor the integrity of hy-
pervisor executions. hShield is embodied with a novel CFI technique which is
designed to detect VM-escape attacks. hShield completes the chain-of-trust
in our series of multi-layered monitoring systems.
While our monitoring systems are specifically designed and customized
for HAV-based virtualization systems, we believe that many fundamental
principles what we explored in this thesis can be applied to security and re-
liability monitoring in general. Throughout the thesis, we argumentatively
and experimentally show that the polling-and-scanning monitoring paradigm
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must be avoided in security monitoring. Instead, we strongly advocate the
use of continuous monitoring, specifically, event-driven monitoring. Our sys-
tems demonstrate that continuous monitoring can be strategically designed
to achieve low-cost, yet high-detection, coverage.
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